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INTRODUCTION

Like most progressive and radical projects in this country, the
education of those future lawyers who plan to work for social change
has met historically with formidable indifference. We just don't seem
to care much and certainly do almost nothing about specially pre-

paring those whose vocation is to work with the subordinated: the
poor, women, people of color, the disabled, the elderly, gays and
lesbians. We presume that students get what they need at law school
about conceptions of practice, about the people with whom they
aspire to work, and about the know-how that unites vocation to
daily routine, or we presume that they somehow later make do.

* Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford University.
This essay was delivered as the Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures at West Virginia University's
College of Law in the spring of 1988. Thanks go to Cathy Bonnar, Ellen Borgersen, Bill Hing, Bill
Klein, Shelley Levine, Jeanne Merino, Larry Ottinger, Cathy Ruchelshaus, Lewis Segall, Steve Shiffrin,
Blanca Silvestrini, and Bob Weisberg, who read and commented on an earlier draft; to participants
at the faculty workshop at-the University of Arizona College of Law where, as a Rosentiel Scholarin-Residence, I presented certain related ideas in the fall of 1987; and to lay community activists,
students, faculty and alumni who have contributed to the efforts to initiate the new Curriculum in
Lawyering for Social Change here at Stanford Law School. Special thanks to Michael Adams for his
thoughtful help and to the people at the West Virginia College of Law who received me with such
warmth and graciousness.
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This indifference, I think, reflects in part a reluctance or refusal
by many in the mainstream to acknowledge subordination as a pervasive phenomena. Certainly you know the basic rap: "We may have
our 'disadvantaged' and certainly the 'unfortunate' among us, and
perhaps we shouldn't forget them. But you can't call them (much
less believe them to be) subordinated by social and political life
without saying something altogether uglier and more potent about
each of us and the world we all help to create-something I'm unwilling to accept. So, as a rather artful preemptive strike, I've just
learned to ignore-and when necessary even to be offended bythis talk about subordination and aspirations to combat it."
This indifference to the training provided those lawyers who ultimately will work with the subordinated reflects, too, a great deal
about legal education in the United States. Though millions in this
country live in social and political subordination and though lawyers
have worked to help challenge these conditions, law schools only
rarely have understood their job to include designing a training regimen responsive to this situation and this task. No doubt law schools,
like many other mainstream institutions and people, assiduously avoid
the political connotations and the considerable work such a commitment would imply. They prefer the comforting belief that "good
training is good training"-for all future lawyers, for all future clients and for all those who find themselves enmeshed in the work
of clients and lawyers.
But, in all honesty, legal education regularly resists changechange of any sort. Calls for transformation of what now goes on
in this country's law schools somehow get deftly deflected, delayed
or diluted. Inertia no doubt plays its role as does flat-out laziness.
But it has also been my experience that calls for change upset many
in the legal profession. Practitioners of all sorts, for example, often
balk at the implication that they themselves may not have been welltrained or may not now practice in imaginative, self-reflective, and
wisely efficient ways. And, on their part, academics of every ilk not
only much prefer thinking that they already do a good job but would
rather dodge the possibility that they themselves may not be equipped
to participate meaningfully in a newly conceived training program.
In these lectures I'd like to outline a fundamentally different
curriculum for those future lawyers who will work with the polithttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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ically and socially subordinated. To do this, I first will set out what
we all should realize about what we do and how we do it in law
schools today. I'll describe legal education's largely unchallenged
general approach, its restricted models of teaching and learning, its
disdain for lawyering and for training in all but a relatively small
number of skills, its neglect of interdisciplinary theoretical ideas, its
disregard of everyday life, and its lack of coordination. And I'll
unearth what I think amounts to a parallel training regimen that
law students have constructed in response to the limits and failures
of the conventional law school curriculum-a regimen that merits
law teachers' appreciation, not scorn. In short, I'll report to you
that, despite some real and unappreciated successes, legal education
remains a stubborn underachiever.
As if all that weren't sobering enough, I'll then describe and
detail the consequences of the insistently generic vision of the world
that pervades law school curricula. Legal education conceives of and
treats people, their traditions, their experiences, and their institutions
as essentially fungible. It declares, at least tacitly, that who people
are, how they live, how they struggle, how they suffer, how they
interact with others, how others interact with them, and how they
relate to conventional governmental and corporate power need not
be taken into account in any sustained and serious way in training
lawyers. Generic legal education teaches law students to approach
practice as if all people and all social life were homogeneous.
Grounded in this understanding of current legal education, I will
then propose a vision of legal education that dynamically connects
how lawyers are trained both to an appreciation of the actual people
and institutions with whom they work and to an understanding of
the demands of practice aimed at elemental social change, whether
in West Virginia, in California or anyplace in this union. Not surprisingly, much of what I call anti-generic legal education will be
foreshadowed by my observations about generic legal educationabout both what teachers do and how students and the legal community respond. What I think we all should realize about what we
do and how we do it in law schools today implies a great deal about
what we all might do to improve it. And every aspect of the training
regimen I propose will be informed by an idea of progressive or
radical lawyering different from that which now dominates both
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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legal education and the practice of law. It is an idea originating in
the experiences and aspirations of subordinated people and the allies
(including lawyers) with whom they work.
In outlining anti-generic legal education, my principal focus will
concern how this country's law schools might approach the education of those lawyers who plan to work with the socially and
politically subordinated. I am not at all interested in some more
well-intentioned tinkering-a little more theory here, another clinical
course there. I am urging, and think legal education is desperately
in need of, a radically reconceived training regimen. Though my
proposal will be specifically tailored to Stanford Law School's current efforts to design and implement a curriculum for lawyers committed to working for social change, I hope that it might permit
other law schools to imagine their own curricular reform in the
training of progressive and radical lawyers-reform that attends to
the particular world in which each law school is situated and to
which I think each should respond.
Along the way, I'll suggest briefly how corporate lawyers might
be trained-not because I spend much time concentrating on the
training of corporate lawyers as such but because some changes seem
so obvious that even a relative outsider like myself can't resist commenting on them. And in the course of my observations you might
well become convinced not only that anti-generic legal education
makes for better lawyers helping to challenge subordination, but that
it even makes for better "generalists," precisely the sort of lawyers
that law schools have always claimed to train and to train well. Still
my principal aim is to convince you that those who will lawyer with
different groups in this heterogeneous world must be trained differently if they are to be effective, and that current legal education
is least suited to addressing the importantly different needs of the
politically and socially subordinated. Perhaps not surprisingly, those
who can least afford to bear the consequences of ineffective legal
education find themselves most burdened by them.
II.

WHAT WE SHOULD ALL REALIZE ABOUT LEGAL EDUCATION

Whether or not you're a lawyer, whether or not you are in the
business of teaching and writing about law, you should pay attention
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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to the debate about legal education in this country.' You should
pay attention if you care about the people and institutions whom
lawyers serve and affect. You should pay attention if you recognize
the link between how lawyers work and how others work with lawyers. You should pay attention if you appreciate the connection
between how lawyers are trained and how lawyers and others conceive of what it is that lawyers actually do in this world.
But I'm not unrealistic. Most people don't ever pay much attention to law, much less legal education; they're happy experiencing
it as "in the background," something to avoid as much as to engage.
Perhaps this shouldn't be surprising. Even law students and law
teachers don't spend much of their day-to-day time talking about
legal education-at least not in any serious and publicly shared way.
And how often are formal talks like the Donley Lectures devoted
to what we do and how we do it in law schools? For most people
legal education somehow seems not quite intellectual enough to be
taken seriously and not quite interesting enough to inspire anything
provocative.
Yet a fair amount has been written and even more has been said
in this debate about what we teach and how we teach in the law
schools of this country. Most of what has been written and said is,
however, not readily accessible outside of the hallways and the journals of law schools. We all still tend to treat these issues as matters
of only professional concern, rather than as matters of general political significance. Even for those who do have access, lots of what
has been written and said is, frankly, not very illuminating. It manages to be at once fairly general and fairly superficial-just this sort
of weak medicine that almost inevitably strengthens the condition
it's meant to improve.
Yet some ideas in what has been written and said do matter.
They matter not so much because they're new (many I think are
quite old), not so much because they are universally acknowledged
as correct (though I think some of them are), and certainly not
1. For example, see Frank, Why Not a ClinicalLawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. Rav. 907 (1933);
Harvard Law School, Rep. of Committee on Educ. Planning & Dev. (1982) [hereinafter Michelman
Report].
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because they have successfully penetrated legal education (though I
think some of them should). Instead, these ideas matter principally
as a sort of intellectual legacy; they symbolize the efforts of lots of
people to rethink what we do in legal education-to rethink it in
both small, seemingly mundane ways, and in large, apparently fantastic ways. Because rethinking what we do is so very difficult in
any realm of life, it helps to realize that there have been any number
of others before us asking related questions about legal education
and pushing things along, not so quickly perhaps, but with a commitment extraordinary in its tenacity. 2
I'll begin with what academics might call a critique of legal education, but what I prefer to think of as a description of what we
all should realize about what we do and how we do it in law schools.
Some ideas in this description undoubtedly find their roots in the
work of many earlier "rethinkers": people whose work I have read,
people whose ideas never made it into print but nevertheless make
the rounds in the circles I've run in, and people whose ideas never
got to me at all (so far as I know) but who I'm sure thought things
not so very different from what I am about to tell you. And other
ideas in this description certainly reflect many hours of conversation
I've had about legal education with students, with staff, with faculty,
with lawyers and with lay people. But, ultimately, this description
tells a great deal more about my own experiences with law schools
than anything else, experiences formally beginning in 1970 and encompassing a range of quite different institutions and people.
Too few generalapproaches-some think only one-dominate legal
education.
If you looked at the course offerings of the great majority of
law schools in this country you would be overwhelmed by what
seems to be the homogeneity of general approach: A required first
year curriculum, focusing almost exclusively on certain core (and
not coincidentally bar) courses, is followed by an eclectic set of
2. See generally, Frank, supra note 1. See also, Michelman Report, supra note 1; Gee &
Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695
(1977) [hereinafter Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap]; Gee & Jackson, Current Studies of Legal
Education: Findings and Recommendations, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 471 (1982).
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second and third year offerings that itself reflects, again, the content
of bar examinations, the idiosyncratic preferences of law faculty,
and some attention to what is often described as practical skills.
This homogeneity may simply mean that law schools have "got
their act together" -they've all agreed (if only tacitly) about what
it is they're doing and how to do it best. However comforting this
view, few people I know in legal education actually buy it. Moreover, few other self-conscious disciplines train their future practitioners in so peculiarly uniform fashion. Elsewhere, in acting, ballet,
basketball, carpentry, and social work, vying conceptions of competence and excellence make for often radically different approaches
to learning and to training. Law schools simply seem unwilling or
unable to imagine and to implement serious alternatives to what
nearly all of them now find themselves doing.
Too few models of teaching and learning-some think only oneshape the structure and routines of the general approach to legal
education.
You know in advance what most courses will look like at the
great majority of law schools: they will meet always as a (typically
large) group in a classroom for three or four hours a week, for
fifteen to sixteen weeks a semester, and will focus primarily on parsing appellate cases through a question and answer format. The "big
classroom," as I call this model of teaching and learning, dominates
the law school scene, in part no doubt because it flexibly accommodates virtually any size enrollment likely to be found in a U.S.
law school class from as large as 200 to as small as five or six.
Yes, you're right, at these same schools you can also find different models of teaching and learning, the majority of which are
at work in certain workshops and clinical courses. You may also
be right if you're thinking that many people-faculty, students, staff
and employers-think these workshops and clinical courses both more
ambitious and more stimulating than the big classroom. But don't
be fooled. Whatever individuals actually think of other models of
teaching and learning, it is the "big classroom" that sets a law
school's rhythm, serves as the source of its folkloric myths, and
fulfills its claim to educational legitimacy.
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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It's not just that in the big classroom model the group always
meets as a group in a classroom for three or four hours a week for
fifteen to sixteen weeks a semester come hell or highwater. It's also
true that in the big classroom there's just too much of the same
kind of teaching and too much of the same kind of learning. Think
about it. You almost always know who's who: the person at the
front of the room (probably talking) is the "teacher," and those
people facing the teacher (possibly listening) are the "students." You
also almost always know how people might describe what you are
watching: the teacher is employing a question and answer formatthe Socratic method-that aspires to generate informed discussion
about the assigned cases. But you almost always know that what
will be going on in the big classroom looks very different from what
people describe: in the big classroom the Socratic method looks suspiciously like a set of mini-lectures by the teacher interrupted by
questions that by now no one really expects to precipitate the kind
of critical conversation among students and teacher that many imagine to be the defining strength of legal education.'
Worse still, it's not exactly clear how teachers and students reconcile these mini-lectures with the mythic image of the big classroom. Quite frequently the teacher's mini-lectures simply repeat
information covered in the reading materials-the same materials
the big classroom model presupposes that students have read and
assimilated before coming to class. At other times, to be sure, the
teacher's mini-lectures do present ideas not found in the reading
materials-say critiques of cases or even alternative visions to certain
doctrinal development. But if you'd look you'd probably find most
of the teacher's ideas in the student notes from previous year's classes. Unless a teacher only quite recently formulated these critiques
or visions, why aren't they always written up and distributed to the

3. One critic has observed, perhaps with only slight exaggeration, that "instead of a partnership
in the learning process and a method by which teacher and student discuss a problem in order to
further the understanding of each, the Socratic style in law schools is merely a means to direct the
student to a position predetermined by the teacher." Bratt, Beyond the Law School Classroom and
Clinic - A MultidisciplinaryApproach To Legal Education, 13 NEW ENO. L. REV. 199, 203 (1977).
See also Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 328 (1982);
Dallimore, The Socratic Method - More Harm Than Good, 3 J. CONTEMi,. L. 177 (1976).
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students in advance of the group meeting? After all, if the students
are genuinely expected to respond to these ideas in the big classroom
wouldn't reading them in advance of the conversation make obvious
sense?
Genealogically, the current state of teaching and learning in the
big classroom may well reflect that the much mythologized Socratic
method has always been something of a fake. It presumed (and
publicly glamorized) that students had prepared well for class discussion, but it never even contemplated systematically providing them
all that was necessary to think through in advance the ideas to be
discussed. It hoped for a lively discussion, but what it envisioned
was talk that was largely scripted, ideally with students filling in the
blanks left open by the teacher. It claimed to respect students, but
never really wanted to engage their actual experiences and ideas. In
truth, the idealized Socratic method so intimately associated with
the big classroom presupposed that students never teach and that
teachers never learn, that teachers exercise but almost never share
power with students, and that teachers are the ones ultimately who
act and that students are the ones ultimately acted upon. 4 Today's
version of the big classroom Socratic method (the interrupted minilecture format)-for all its weaknesses-may only appear less ambitious than its idealized forefather and may well be less hypocritical.
Now perhaps you're thinking "so what?" Maybe teaching in the
big classroom really isn't now about-if in fact it ever was abouthaving an informed, critical conversation between students and
teacher. Perhaps it currently underscores the importance of simple
repetition to transmitting information-a notion of the big classroom as cognitive reinforcer. Or perhaps it reveals the importance
of learning to improvise responses to ideas that others have had a
long time to think through but spring on you unannounced-a notion of the big classroom as training for ambush. But, if you fancy
either of these explanations, you should realize that most law teachers I know don't agree and with good reason. After all, mini-lectures

4. Of course, this view is hardly unique to law school's big classroom Socratic method. See
generally P. FR mE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970); A. SWIDLER, ORGANIZATION WITHoUT AuTHORITY (1979).
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through a question and answer format in the big classroom seem
both an incredibly inefficient means of information transmittal and
a very crude method of developing the ability to handle the intellectual equivalent of an ambush (a skill, by the way, almost surely
overrated in its importance to most lawyers).
Or perhaps you're saying to yourself that at least some big classroom teachers must have purposeful and refined reasons for sticking
by familiar practices. And you're right. For example, some big classroom legal history teachers defend their lectures-formal and minias well-suited to their task. Though these lectures may appear principally to rehearse and paraphrase the content of readings, they actually serve to bring to life and specially emphasize what students
otherwise too often find dull and undifferentiated in the written
text-a notion of the big classroom where the teacher serves as a
galvanizing, aural, intellectual force.
There's sense, to be sure, in these more purposeful pedagogic
explanations. In challenging the big classroom model of instruction,
no one should want to convert learning into a non-aural, atomistic
enterprise. Nor should anyone underappreciate the importance of
reinforcement and reemphasis, nor underestimate the role of a teacher's influence on the students' learning spirit. Still, why not convert
previous lecture notes into written commentary on the principal text?
And why not aspire to an aural community of learning by employing
a set of pedagogic vehicles that demands more of students than
simply taking yet another set of lecture notes? Instead of having so
much pass through the teacher, why not help students galvanize one
another?
Now a handful of quite self-conscious big classroom legal history
teachers have responses to at least some of my challenges. For instance, they would argue that if you convert oral commentary into
written form students will bypass the principal text-if not because
it is hard going, then because students are deeply socialized to limit
their intake to what the teacher declares important. Why work
through Langdell, Pound or Llewellyn when you can turn to the
instructor's written commentary on these historical texts? If you
think, as I do, that students should learn to read original historical
(as well as interdisciplinary and theoretical) literature, in part behttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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cause it directly informs and often can directly assist resourceful
lawyering, then it is worrisome that these teachers may be right in
thinking that a written commentary would have an undesirable effect.
But even such pinpointed concerns are themselves often founded
on quite contestable pedagogical assumptions-in this instance, that
accompanying commentary necessarily discourages students from
reading difficult original texts. It has been my experience that, for
most students, certain kinds of written commentary encourage both
more cbnfident reading and more confident criticism of the original
texts. Well-crafted written commentary lets students in on the teacher's "take" and frees them to ask whether or not they have a different angle on things-for example, what should they themselves
(not the teacher) make of Langdell's classical/positivist views and
Pound's vision of law as policy science . 5 My experience hardly ends
the debate, I realize, but it certainly would seem to present an empirical challenge of considerable force. More to the point, my experience is among a family of experiences that call into question
continued reliance on the conventional big classroom format and
that should especially compel self-conscious big classroom teachers
radically to rethink not only the relationship of readings to admirable pedagogical aspirations but their own roles as instructors.
But the truth is that most teachers who practice their teaching
in the big classroom don't have a very self-conscious idea of why
it is they do what they do. They simply find themselves-like their
students-trapped in a largely unexamined set of structures and routines. Indeed some teachers and students in law schools seem to
have cut something of a deal. The students permit themselves to be
bored, boring, and infantilized, so long as no one challenges too
openly their disengagement. The teachers permit themselves to be
bored, boring and thoroughly unambitious so long as no one examines too closely their teaching. These students and teachers now
bear roughly the same relationship to each other in the big classroom
as do the viewers and the creators of television sitcoms. They pass

5. These concepts are discussed in Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pn-r. L. REv. 1 (1983).
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precious hours doing their best to make the banal entertaining enough
to dull their critical sensibilities. Neither demands too much of the
other and neither openly exposes the considerable fatuousness of
their time spent together.
There are those few, of course, whose teaching in the big classroom stands in stark contrast both to the mythologized Socratic
method and to the actual teaching practices found in most big classrooms today. These teachers actually depend upon precisely what
most other law teachers seem to fear most-they expect, no, they
need to find themselves in the big classroom with really well-prepared students, students who, going into the conversation, have assimilated both what the materials say and what the teachers think.
For these teachers see the classroom-yes, even the big classroomnot principally as a place for the instructor's restatement (even the
lively restatement) of ideas in the readings but as a setting primarily
geared for the task of apprehending and commanding a practice.
In this setting, students learn by doing-by putting to use, challenging, and improvising their own fledgling alternatives to the conventions, stocks of knowledge, and patterns of know-how central
to the work of lawyers. And teachers teach by a sort of coachingby designing, by getting students ready for, through, and reflecting
on a set of (broadly defined) practice simulations. In this conception
of the big classroom, well-prepared students trigger the very possibility of a reciprocally reflective relationship with the teacher. It
is a relationship where it becomes apparent that teachers do learn
and students do teach, where the aspiration is to share and exercise
power responsibly, and where everyone's engaged risks change along
the way. 6
Yet even if these extraordinary teachers were everywhere in legal
education,, a curriculum dominated by the conventional big class6. Such relationships are difficult to establish and to sustain in the "clinical" as well as the

big classroom setting. One commentator argues that students are not good critics of their teachers'
work because of the disparity in experience, status, perspective and authority. Condlin, "Tastes Great,
Less Rilling:" The Law School Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45 (1986). There's
much to this claim that deserves special and extended attention, and I hope in time to express my
own views. But, in passing, it seems important to note that currently perceived disparities may well
be produced by what legal education now defines as relevant conversation and valuable knowledge-about both lawyering and law.
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room model of teaching and learning would still badly undereducate
its future lawyers. Big classrooms focus attention on learning to read
cases, on learning to identify and replicate stock stories and arguments that define a body of legal doctrine, on learning to bring
a body of legal doctrine to bear on a social situation, and on picking
up along the way some information about and some appreciation
for how the legal culture operates. These are important ideas and
skills and the big classroom can provide some productive angles for
focusing attention on them: it can give you some appreciation for
how others respond to the same cultural practices and artifacts, it
can permit you to try out (at least to yourself) and hear others try
out standard lines of analyses and persuasion, and it can provide
you some opportunity to note in yourself and others the very transition from outsider to cultural insider about which many students
7
feel genuine ambivalence.
The big classroom introduces, exposes, and illustrates certain dimensions of the legal culture. And it can permit students to "try
on for size" certain problem-solving and conceptual speculation. But
if there's lots we can do in the conventional big classroom, there's
also lots we can't do. Even in a well-managed big classroom, introductions are at best partial, exposures are sometimes serious but
almost never sustained, and illustrations are often clever but rarely
deep. Think honestly about even more ambitious contracts, corporations, criminal procedure and constitutional law classes you know
and I think you will find my descriptions accurate. Moreover, in
the big classroom most problem-solving and conceptual speculation
is fitful, haphazard, and almost always artificially bounded by the
class' doctrinal focus. You know the routine: students think of problems in contracts only as contracts problems, and in constitutional
law only as constitutional law problems. While all this is not made
necessary by the big classroom format itself, it occurs in a way that
regularly ignores what we know about how problems spill over across
doctrinal boundaries and in a way that frequently initiates bad practice habits. Worse still, only infrequently are students made re7. See Anderson, Lawyering in the Classroom: An Address to First Year Students, 10 NovA
L. J. 271, 278-88 (1986).
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sponsible for assessing an entire problem, both comprehensively and
deeply. They can come to believe that having something glib to say
is the equivalent of careful problem solving and provocative thinking.
To be sure, big classrooms need not be treated as frozen pedagogical vehicles. They can be reimagined and retooled. You can
introduce a wiser mix of both richly detailed and purposely skeletal
social situations for students systematically to work their way
through; you can regularly demand more written work on small and
large projects and provide more feedback throughout the semester;
you can utilize more serious and sustained simulated activities; you
can purposefully break down the big classroom into smaller work
units. In short, you can transform the conventional big classroom
into a set of experiences that feel like well-conceived, intellectually
rigorous and sensible practice sessions that take advantage of big
classroom opportunities without accepting this conventional wisdom
about productive activities. 8 But as much as I favor and indeed as
much as I have spent a great deal of my career trying productively
to break out of big classroom conventions, these breakthroughs tell
us at least as much about the ultimate limits as the untried possibilities of the big classroom model of teaching and learning. We
should reimagine and retool the big classroom but we shouldn't
think we can make it into anything we please. It is destined, after
all, for quite limited and specific roles in any wise future curriculum.
At a deeper level still, experimenting with the big classroom makes
plain just how much we all mindlessly buy into the present structure
and routines of legal education. Even at (or perhaps precisely at)
those very moments when those of us in legal education like to think
ourselves quite imaginative and innovative, I fear we almost never
fundamentally rethink what it is we're doing and how it is we're
doing it. How often do we note and examine choices we regularly
make about the uses of space, time, what students already know,
what law teachers know, what others know about clients, lawyers
and the legal culture? Why have we come to certain conclusions
about what students can learn on their own and what they must
8. Id.
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learn from a teacher in a classroom? Why do we treat some activities
and not others as teaching and some activities and not others as
learning? I could go on, but the point is that the big classroom's
current dominance of the structure and routines of legal education
may only be symptomatic of a more profound problem: we only
rarely take stock of and examine how we use, how we develop, and
how we reward the use and development of basic resources.
Too few skills make their way into and get serious attention in the
general approach to legal education.
You needn't look much further than the dominance of the big
classroom model of teaching and learning to conclude that legal
education focuses on too few skills-on too few of the wide range
of evolving competences (understanding and know-how) that at any
point in time constitute and remake the practice of law. Unless a
student makes a concerted effort to avoid big classes, three years
in law school may well end up feeling like a relentless regimen that
focuses on a tiny family of related skills-reading, dissecting and
deploying appellate cases (and a statute here and there). A former
colleague of mine once told a group of entering first year students
that law school might not get them ready to hang out their own
shingle but it sure would prepare them marvelously if, upon graduation, any of them happened to get appointed to the appellate
bench.
People have long speculated about why, apart from the dominance of the conventional big classroom, legal education seemed so
resolutely against offering anything like adequate training in the range
of skills demanded of various lawyers. Or as the question is more
euphemistically (and I think misleadingly) put, "Why don't law
schools do 'skills training?' " Some claim "skills training" is beneath law schools-the elitism hypothesis. Still others claim that
"skills training" is beyond those who teach in law schools-the incompetence hypothesis. Still others claim that "skills training" is
too expensive-the fiscal constraints hypothesis. Finally, others still
claim that "skills training" is best done after law school- the wise
division of responsibility hypothesis. 9
9. For still more explanations as to why law schools do not provide adequate "skills training"
to their students, see Keeton, Teaching & Testing for Competence in Law Schools, 40 MD. L. REv.
203, 212-14 (1981).
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There's continuing truth of one sort or another in each of these
hypotheses. If "skills training" isn't in fact beneath, beyond, too
expensive, or too unwise for law schools to provide, then certainly
there are many who perceive the truth in one or more of these selfabsolutions. And no doubt the very availability of this "litany of
pardons," as I call it, provides a certain comfort for everyone involved. Whether you count yourself as foe or ally of expanded skills
training in law schools, you can more readily convince yourself that
moving glacially on this front makes good institutional sense when
change appears to implicate so many fundamental questions, concerns, expectations, and feelings. After all, how radically and quickly
can you responsibly transform a culture?
Yet reality stands somewhat at odds with the image of legal education depicted in the litany of pardons. After all, law schools have
always taught skills-not many, to be sure, and probably not nearly
as well as they might. Still, skills are, in part, precisely what's being
passed on in the curricular preoccupation with learning to read and
use cases. Many teachers and institutions may not have cared much
about-may even detest-the notion of skills training. But at some
point it seems inevitable that they will come to realize that narrow
and repetitive skills training, coupled with a certain sort of initiation
into the legal culture, comes closest to describing what they've been
doing with their students for all these decades. To the extent these
same teachers and institutions still oppose extended skills training,
they may in part simply want to avoid the embarrassment they perceive in this appraisal.
And you can't ignore that, over the last fifteen years or so, legal
education has moved modestly in the direction of expanded skills
training. In almost any of today's law school catalogs you're likely
to find several course titles like "Interviewing and Counseling,"
"Trial Advocacy," and "Estate Planning and Will Drafting." These
courses fall within what most people in law schools have come to
call "clinical education"-a name loosely signifying (among other
things) that these courses focus student attention on the development
of a range of previously neglected skills usually through role simulations or through actual supervised work as student practition-
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ers. 10 The very presence of these "clinical" offerings would seem to
imply some appreciation for, some fundamental integration of, the
need to devote more law school time and resources to a wider range
of skill development. Some might even surmise that these course
offerings reveal that law teachers may well have undergone a sort
of collective consciousness-raising about both their work and legal
education generally.
Yet you should pause before concluding that this relatively recent
expansion of course offerings signals any profound shift in faculty
or institutional consciousness. If you did take that careful look at
today's law school catalogs, you'd find that those courses specifically
offering skills training are usually meager in number, somewhat irregularly available and often tactfully set off to the side from the
"regular" curriculum. You'd also find that, with greater frequency
than other courses, these offerings are taught by adjuncts, visitors,
clinical instructors, or teachers with some other "specialized" titles.
Whatever else these distinctions may suggest, they do decree how
peripheral the very idea of extended skills training remains to basic
legal education. In fact, these new courses probably betray minor
concessions to noisy constituencies more than they imply some deeper
institutional appreciation for the central place of skills training in
legal education."
That the very idea of skills training remains, even today, off to
the side of the basic law school curriculum reflects, I think, a largely
unappreciated fact that is more basic even than the litany of pardons: legal education has been and is still almost entirely about law
10. Regarding the increased number of clinical education courses, see Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Legal Education, in Tm GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' RoLEs & LAWYERS' ETmcs, 317,
319 (D. Luban, ed. 1983); Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap, supra note 2 at 881. For a review of
some of the literature on clinical education see Michelman Report, supra note 1, Ch. 6.
11. Viewing the concerns of clinical education (people, unstructured situations and feelings) as
stereotypically feminine in our culture, some claim that the marginalization of clinical education must

be understood in the context of existing gender hierarchy. See, e.g., Tushnet, Scenes from the Metropolitan Underground:A Critical Perspective on the Status of Clinical Education, 52 G. WASH. L.
REv. 272, 274-75 (1984). See also Redmount & Shaffer, Learning the Law - Thoughts Toward a
Human Perspective, 51 NoTrE DAME LAW L. REV. 956, 962 (1976); Oliphant, When Will Clinicians
be Allowed to Join the Club,LEARrHNG & THm L. 34 (June-Sept. 1976) (regarding the marginalization
of clinicians from law school faculties).
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and is only incidentally and superficially about lawyering. 2 Law
teachers think, teach, and write a great deal about the law of contracts or the law of toxic waste, and only barely about what lawyers
do for and with people in situations partly defined by contract law
or toxic waste law. Law teachers almost obsessively study the results
of formal legal disputes but pay almost no attention to how disputes
emerge and transform and to how professional lawyering affects
these emergencies and transformations. Law teachers spend enormous energy tinkering with the doctrinal formulations of discrimination law but devote almost no resources discovering whether and
in what ways discrimination law and the work of discrimination
lawyers penetrate the lives of millions upon millions of people for
whom they are ostensibly designed.
Lawyering simply never has been where it's at for law schools,
in large part, because of the exceedingly narrow and impoverished
conceptions of practice that dominate legal education. When practice
is not crudely portrayed as simple mechanics, it is understood as
the application of existing categories of legal knowledge (rules) to
the case at hand (facts) in a world where there's presumed to be a
right answer and where "thinking like a lawyer" means learning the
ways in which a competent practitioner would finally connect category to case. As a result, law school training largely ignores what
ought to be both the challenge and the artistry of the practice of
law: the dynamics of inevitably working with other people in framing
and responding to conflicting, uncertain and unique situations; the
interaction of lay and professional understanding and know-how;
the influence of cultural and cognitive forces on problem-solving;
and the impact of income and other power disparities on perceptions
and strategies. In short, law school teachers have long acquiesced

12. The first criticisms of legal education for its neglect of lawyering were aired more than
seventy years ago. See Stone, The Importance of Actual Experience at the Bar as a Preparationfor
Law Teaching, 37 REP. A.B.A. 747 (1912); Kales, Should the Law Teacher PracticeLaw?, 25 HARv.
L. REv. 253 (1912); Frank, supra note 1; Keyserling, Social Objectives in Legal Education, 33 COLUM.
L. REv. 437 (1933). Relatively recent surveys of practitioners reveal that "the skills rated by lawyers
as most important to the practice of law were learned outside law school - that is, through the lawyers'
own experiences." SPECIAL ComITTEE FOR A STUDY OF LEGAL EDUCATION, A.B.A., LAW SCHOOLS &
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 48 (1980). See also Baird, A Survey of the Relevance of Legal Training to
Law School Graduates, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 264, 272-77 (1978).
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in visions of lawyering that suit, most of all, their pedagogical comfort.
The advent of modern clinical education in the early 1970's posed
a significant challenge to law school culture not simply because it
aimed to expand the amount of skills training but because it aspired
13
to teach skills as part of a self-conscious appreciation of practice.
Some even saw it as threatening potentially to subvert legal education's romance with formal law and with the technocratic role of
lawyers (a strange romance that somehow has outlived the late 19th
century world in which it first blossomed). 14 So long as law teachers
continuously focused on law they could rather regularly and comfortably abstract away from life, supporting the self-serving illusions
that we can get law right and that we can get life ordered once and
for all. Insofar as clinical education seemed likely to focus significantly more law school attention on practice, some thought it would
introduce the messiness of living and lawyering upon thought and
action, making it perfectly obvious that the romance with final technocratic solutions was nonsense (an admittedly odd point to feel the
need to make if we are truly all "realists" now).
Much today appears to suggest, however, that the subversive
promise of clinical education was largely exaggerated. 5 Clinical education in the minds of many now amounts to several additional
course offerings focusing on certain lawyering skills otherwise neglected in the basic curriculum. There has been some sporadic introduction of clinical teaching methodology-principally
simulations-into the basic curriculum, but there has been very little
in the way of an intellectual, political, and emotional shift from law
to lawyering. Insofar as teaching and scholarship are reliable indicators, most law teachers continue to treat formal law as endlessly
intriguing and complex; at the same time, they persist in treating

13.
generally
14.
15.
"clinics"

This aspiration was, I think, part of an effort to appreciate and elaborate "practice" more
defined. See, e.g., P. Botmnmu, OUtLnW oF A THEoRY OF PRAcTICE (R. Nice trans. 1977).
See generally Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PrrT. L. REv. 1 (1983).
Some see clinical education itself as failing to live up to its own promises, in part because
frequently replicate many of the unproductive methods of instruction utilized in the traditional big classroom. See e.g., Condlin, supra nn. 6 & 10; and Condlin, Socrates New Clothes:
Substituting Persuasionfor Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REv. 223 (1981).
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lawyering as transparently vapid and obvious. 16 The life of lawyering

in law schools in the late 1980s seems in many ways like the life
of lawyering in law schools in the early 1970s-demeaned when not
neglected.

Still you should know that there are signs of a kind of savvy
unrest. If clinical education seems now to amount to only several
peripheral skills courses in most curricula, many today appreciate
that this marginal status seems almost profoundly at odds with the
relatively high regard in which these courses are held by students. 7
If most law teachers continue to treat formal law as endlessly intriguing and complex, many today sense that this treatment may
ironically reveal only that law teachers find law soothingly tangible,
knowable, and criticizable. If most law teachers persist in treating
lawyering as transparently vapid and obvious, many today sense that
this treatment may ironically reveal only that law teachers find lawyering profoundly intangible, mysterious, and elusive. Indeed, many
may be beginning to appreciate that legal institutions and law teachers may be scared of not just what attention to practice will do to
their classes but what it will do to their professional and everyday
identities.

18

The fate of skills training then influences as much as it reflects
the underlying battle between legal education's traditional focus and
the upstart effort to introduce practice (richly conceived) into the

16. This devaluation of lawyering by law teachers may reflect, at least in part, self-doubt as
to whether they have any real understanding of practice. "One way to justify the fact that one does
not know something is to keep repeating over and over again that it is not important to know it."
Redlich, Clinical Education: Stranger in an Elitist Club, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 201, 207 (1981).
17. One indication of this high regard is, of course, student enrollment. At Stanford Law
School, the Registrar's Office reports that clinical courses historically have been oversubscribedsometimes dramatically oversubscribed. For example, during the academic years 1987-88 and 198889, every one of the total number of 18 clinical courses offered (10 offered in 87-88, 8 offered in
88-89) drew more applicants than it had slots. Indeed, 10 of these 18 courses attracted at least twice
as many applicants as available slots, and two courses pulled in over four times more applicants than
slots.
18. The clash between traditional notions of legal education and a new focus on lawycring
reflects a fundamental challenge to the current ordering of priorities in law schools-a challenge that
cuts at the core of the educational objectives to which many law teachers are wedded. See Redlich,
supra note 16 at 205-07; Barnhizer, ClinicalEducation at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction,
1977 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 1025, 1032-34 (1977); MCFARLAND, Self-Images Of Law Professors:Rethinking
The Schism In Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232 (1985).
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law school culture. You can't be entirely confident of what's happening, not just because the signs appear so frequently contradictory, but because shifts of sentiment seem so often temporary,
unstable and even ungrounded. What you see is not always what
you get. All you can know is that, while the subversive promise of
clinical education remains largely unrealized, the story is still unfolding.
Too little theory, of any sort, makes its way into and gets serious
attention in the general approach to legal education.
Whenever a law school (or any school) doesn't teach skills, it
usually claims to be devoted to, and preoccupied with, teaching theory. When skills and theory are juxtaposed in this way, skills are
usually meant to signify and be about the practical world-the nittygritty, the how to, the mundane. By contrast, theory is meant to
symbolize and be about the world of intellectual thought-the unessential, the non-instrumental, the deadly serious/playfully speculative abstract. I am among those who find the terms of this
juxtaposition exaggerated and highly problematic. They strongly imply that skills and theory deal with (and should deal with) not just
different but distinct domains; they fail to acknowledge how the two
link, interact, work as one. Worse still, from my perspective, devotees of each domain animate this dichotomy with their tendency
to belittle the other: theorists often will describe those who teach
skills as involved with "mechanics," while those who teach skills
will describe theorists as having their heads in the clouds, as being
out of touch and probably useless to the "real world."
Whatever you think of this dichotomy, legal education generally
buys into it. So,. since law schools focus on too few skills in their
training, you might presume that they at least pay serious attention
to theoretical questions. But you'd be wrong. Law school courses
generally spend a great deal of time and effort transmitting the law
of property, tort, corporations, and federal jurisdiction-what the
legal culture calls doctrine. Doctrine, you should realize, is anything
but self-defining-however much people throw around the term. For
some teachers and schools, it can mean nothing much more than
the fairly uninspired and uncritical statement of rules or principles
of law-what some like to call "black letter law." For more amDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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bitious teachers and schools, it encompasses the identification and
deconstruction of law's currently available stock of stories and arguments into which parties and problems regularly get typecast. Doctrine also encompasses the self-conscious exploration of characteristic
policy concerns that bear both on the choices of stories and arguments from within the stock and on evolution of the stock itself. 19
But the real point to appreciate is that, however formulated, doctrine
is the stuff of legal education.
By contrast to the attention doctrine receives, law school courses
generally invest very little time and effort explicitly identifying and
elaborating underlying theoretical conceptions-conceptions of human interaction, of conflict, of the capital market, of problem-solving, and of the state. At the end of three years of education, law
students probably are no better equipped to describe and critique
the political and economic theories underlying various legal arrangements than they are ready immediately to hang out their own shingle.
That's right, they're neither very theoretical nor very skillful. They
are consumed by doctrine, much as they have been made to consume
it.20

If you would spend as much time as I do trying to figure out
exactly why legal education so religiously avoids theory you would
probably discover more along the way than you would care to learn
about those in legal academic jobs. You would discover that a surprising number of people simply don't read very widely-not just
across disciplines but even in their own field. You would also discover a certain mix of fear and disdain for theoretical enterprisesa sort of "that fancy stuff's not law" attitude. You would even
discover, somewhat ironically, that most of those interested in and
many of those producing theoretical scholarship only infrequently
introduce this work into their own teaching. Scholarly attention to
theoretical matters may well help establish the pecking order between
19. See generallyMichelman, JustificationAnd Justiciability Of Law In A Contradictory World,
in Nomos XVIII: 18 JUSTIFICATION 71-73, 85-86 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986); Lopez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1984).
20. While law students are consumed by doctrine, it seems questionable whether they can be
said truly to comprehend it if they do not have an understanding of its social and political history
amd how it concretely affects everyday problems. See Keeton, supra note 9, at 205-06.
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law schools and between faculty at any particular law school, but
theory (like skills training) at nearly every institution plays only a
peripheral role in the education of our future lawyers.
In many ways, none of these discoveries should come as a great
surprise. Law schools have never paid much attention to theory;
most current law faculty come to teaching equipped with many things
but have only whatever formal theoretical training they received as
law students or as undergraduates. And legal education continues
to reflect, as much as anything, what faculty feel both equipped to
put into their teaching and rewarded for doing with their teaching.
Perhaps what we're seeing, then, is simply a story of "law schools
do now what they have always done and teachers train now much
as they themselves were trained." Maybe law school education and
law teachers simply reproduce one another.
But if you push law teachers for specific answers to why they
don't integrate theory into their teaching, you're likely to find something approaching a self-conscious, substantive defense of the current approach. One line of defense seems highly self-interested, hardly
what you would call ambitious and at times even borders on shamelessness. "Teaching theory doesn't get you high teaching ratings,"
and "Teaching hard theory is hard work." You should know that
answers of this kind are hardly an irrational response to the reward
system in most law schools. By and large, teaching theory doesn't
pay in legal education today, and we all should wonder why (too
hard to study for? to test? upsets expectations?). Still, most people
do expect more from this country's educators, so that even those
law teachers who buy this line of defense don't frequently expose
it to public scrutiny.
Another line of defense for keeping theory out of, or at the
fringes of, legal education clusters around two themes. The first
theme, more tacit than explicit in what I hear law teachers saying,
pushes the notion that doctrine is the pertinent "theory"of lawat least the sort of ambitious doctrinal learning that includes both
stocks of relevant stories and arguments and stocks of underlying
policy concerns. From this vantage point, the virtue of legal knowledge is that it does not blindly follow trends-either theoretical trends
in academic life or social trends in workaday life. Because legal
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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knowledge must serve well and develop in this midst of conflict, it
is necessarily synthetic, reflective, and reactive. To understand law
theoretically, law students therefore must be exposed to and must
develop a sense of how legal knowledge operates and evolves. They
must be, in sum, exposed to doctrine.
The second theme in this line of defense, less substantive yet
more explicit than the first, is that there's just no time to teach
theory. Teaching doctrine fills up a huge number of the allotted
class hours: there's lots of information, some of it tough to assimilate; there are themes in the doctrinal stories to play out and arguments to identify, experiment with and critique; and there are
policies to elaborate, to call into question and to put into conflict.
In fact, as some law teachers see it, people shouldn't be worrying
about theory but should instead worry about how to get in all the
doctrinal law that the students should learn. Law schools not only
shouldn't, but can't be graduate departments in economic theory,
psychological theory, political theory or anything else. Law schools
teach law and there's too much of that for anything else to play
an integral role.
This defense of legal education's preoccupation with teaching
doctrine-by contrast to the "teaching theory doesn't pay" lineseems anything but shameless. And I think it captures certain conceptual and practical insights about what goes into and what's going
on in legal education. Law is, in many ways, a derivative discipline,
and there's certainly not enough time to teach either all of legal
doctrine in three years or even all of many discrete areas of legal
doctrine in a three or four or even a five-unit class. But not only
have you missed the mark if you think that these insights necessarily
support keeping theory on the fringes of law school curricula, you
also may well be simultaneously ignoring the more radical upheaval
of conventional legal education that these insights might well imply.
Let me explain. If you believe legal knowledge is derivative you
should care all the more about exposing future lawyers to its origins
and its influences. To be sure, some of these origins and influences
can be found in the legal doctrine itself. For example, if in 1983
you were examining National Steel's threatened shutdown of its ophttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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eration in Weirton, West Virginia,2' case law on plant closings might
reveal both complex argument strategies deployed by labor and by

management, and the ways in which the legal culture responds to
these interactive strategies in its efforts to make sense of and bring
some justice to these traumatic disputes.2 2 Parsing this case law with

students, at least when done well, helps them develop a sense of
the legal positions in issue, of the supportive argumentation, and
of the customary policy concerns that variously bear on the reso-

lutions of these disputes.
But legal doctrine can ignore and obscure as much as it appar-

ently reveals. The same case law on plant closings rarely makes
available to its readers the interdisciplinary conceptual thought helping to shape both the social dispute and the legal strategies deployed.

If you really wanted law students to understand what was going on
in Weirton in 1983 or, more generally, to understand plant closings
as phenomena with which the law deals, you could not be com-

fortable simply with having them read the cases, having them assimilate story and argument conventions, and having them engage

in some perhaps heartfelt but necessarily cursory conversation about
what underlies the conflict. You also would have to equip them, at
least in some modest way and at some point in time before or while
they study plant closings, with explicit knowledge about those theories meeting at the "busy intersection" of these disputes-say with

competing conceptions of property, competing conceptions of community, competing conceptions of political economy and with competing conceptions of institutional governance. In short, to get to

the very origins and influences of the law of plant closings you have
21. For the story of how employees purchased Weirton Steel to avoid National Steel's shutdown
and now successfully operate it as the largest wholly employee-owned industrial corporation in this
country, see MErAL CENTER NEws, May, 1985 at 70; The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1984, § 1,
at 6; Chicago Tribune, May 15, 1988, § 7, at 2; WEIRTON STEaL CoRP., 1987 A1NNUAL REPORT (1988).
22. For example, in Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d
1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980), the United States Steel Workers' Union challenged U.S. Steel's right to
close two steel plants in Youngstown, Ohio, initially arguing that local managers had promised employees that the plants would remain open as long as they were profitable and that the employees
had relied on these promises to their detriment. When the company subsequently refused to sell the
plants to the union, the union added two additional legal claims: that the company's refusal to sell
the plants to the union was a violation of federal antitrust law, id. at 1282-83, and that the refusal
to sell violated the union's community property right. Id. at 1279-82.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989

25

WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 91, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 5

[Vol. 91

to reach beyond legal doctrine to interdisciplinary theoretical
23
thought.
And if you really wanted the same law students to understand
how lawyers in Weirton work with people and with institutions confronting the reality of a plant closing, you could not be satisfied
with what case law on plant closing happens to reveal about what
clients, lawyers and their professional and lay allies do together.
You also would have to make available to students the interdisciplinary work that attempts both to account for and, at least indirectly, to guide the practice of law. You would have to equip them,
again at least in some modest way and at some point in time before
or while they study plant closings, with explicit knowledge of those
conceptual formulations relevant to conflicting (if still largely underarticulated) ideas of lawyering-say to competing conceptions of
cognitive psychology, to competing conceptions of public choice dynamics, to competing conceptions of dispute resolution, and to competing conceptions of work itself. In short, to get to the very origins
and influences of the lawyering implicated in plant closings you would
have to reach beyond legal doctrine to interdisciplinary theoretical
thought.
But, now more than ever, you may be thinking that those law
teachers who claim that there's just not enough time to teach theory
must be right. After all, if serious attention to the origins and influences of legal knowledge-that is, the knowledge of both lawyering and law-demands student exposure to such diverse theoretical
thought as well as to doctrinal learning, how are law schools responsibly to do it all? The answer lies, in part, in penetrating the
practices that constitute the current training regime in legal education-in making out generally what law teachers think they're doing in relying so exclusively on legal doctrine as the source of wellconceived training and in discerning what law students seem to be
doing in response to this regimen. What I think you find in pen23. For a thoughtful invocation of certain interdisciplinary theoretical thought relevant to plant
shutdowns such as those which occurred in Youngstown, Ohio, and which almost occurred in Weirton,
West Virginia, see the discussion of social vision, political economy, and the free market model in
Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1988).
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etrating these practices, however, may not be what you would expect
in undertaking the examination.
You can be certain that, in providing a training regime focused
almost exclusively on legal doctrine, law teachers are not now proclaiming, if they ever did, that their educational mission is to make
certain that their students know all or even a substantial amount of
all legal doctrine. No law school's course offerings cover anything
approaching all conceivable legal doctrine. And, in order to graduate, each law student must take only a percentage of those courses
actually offered in the curriculum. Moreover, at nearly all law
schools, students are free after their first year to elect the majority
of courses they will take during their second and third years.
Instead, through the current training regime, law teachers collectively seem to be saying something quite different-something
roughly like "we train law students principally to learn how to learn
and how to use legal doctrine." To learn corporations law or administrative law or environmental law or constitutional law is, in
the minds of most teachers, at least generally to learn how to learn
and how to use legal doctrine as well as to learn the particular legal
doctrine governing corporations, the administrative state, the environment or the federal government. Of course, most law teachers
do think some legal doctrine matters more to a lawyer's training
than other legal doctrine-that's why they require it of or recommend it to students. Yet law students get to choose a substantial
number of their courses principally because law teachers think that
most any course will do in providing students yet another opportunity to master doctrinal acquisition and deployment while learning
some information. 24
At some level, all students get their teachers' messages-that
learning how to learn and how to use legal doctrine is the principal
aspiration of law school training. And most students acquiesce in,
even if they don't come to believe in, the wisdom of this training

24. Learning how to learn and how to use legal doctrine-roughly the equivalent of what most
mean when talking about learning how to "think like a lawyer"-is viewed by both teachers and
students as an extremely important aspect of legal education. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note 3, at 201;
Redlich, supra note 16, at 204-05.
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regime. Law students frequently adjust their own aims to match this
curricular aspiration and certainly tailor their own work habits to
meet the demands made of them. They pay close attention to what
it means to do well in the classroom, to what it means to do well
on exams and to precisely how law school doctrinal learning relates
both to their own part-time or summer jobs and to what lawyers
actually do at work. In fact, in many ways law students seem to
have made a real art of attending carefully to the cues that law
teachers build into the three years of training.25
By contrast, law teachers either have not paid very careful attention or (more likely) have not responded well to the ways in which
students actually manage to learn how to learn and how to use legal
doctrine over the course of their law school careers. During the first
year, students seem generally to accept the need for and may respond
well to the slow, swirling unfolding of method through content that
so characterizes law school teaching. But, certainly beginning in the
second year, and perhaps earlier, many students come to understand
that they actually can pick up the patterns of stories, arguments,
and policy concerns that constitute a particular body of doctrine
without engaging at all actively in the regimen that the teacher pursues in and around the classroom. Students appreciate that they need
only read cases cursorily (if at all), need only become happy listeners
in the classroom (if they attend at all), and still learn and use the
legal doctrine in just the ways demanded by the teacher. All they
need do is diligently gather the appropriate commercial outlines and
hornbooks, get hold of the notes from or better still an outline of
the particular teacher's course, and spend a short intense period of
time making the information their own, in part by putting it to use
on old exam questions. That's right, they've transformed the big
classroom into something much resembling a correspondence course. 26

25. In addition to paying attention to the cues provided by law teachers, law students can avail
themselves of numerous publications designed to explain to them in a straightforward and concise
manner precisely how to act in class, how to process doctrine and how to succeed on law school
exams. For example, see K. HEGLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY & PRACTICE OF LAW IN A NUT-

SHELL (1983).
26. Among the most common commercial materials used by law students are outlines and
materials published by Emmanuel's, Gilbert's, and Sum and Substance. These outlines at times serve
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Sadly, most teachers condemn, rather than try to take advantage
of, what student practices might well teach everyone about the current training regimen. Some teachers see these student practices as
the vulgarization of what once was an enviable learning spirit in
students of law; others see these practices as a sensible response to
emotional needs though the response is in many other ways unfortunate or unnecessary. 27 And nearly all teachers like believing that
students miss out on something indispensable whenever they disengage from the conventional training regimen-even if those indispensable qualities are neither measured by the very exams those
same teachers write nor made explicit in any way that students or
teachers find intellectually coherent and convincing.
Yet, teachers aren't alone in failing to see the possibilities in
student practices. Students often don't like confronting the full consequences of their own behavior either. Even while in many ways
appreciating that over the years they have designed their own quite
successful parallel regimen for learning how to learn and how to
use legal doctrine, many students can't imagine launching a broadside attack on the traditional classroom regimen. Instead, they either
ignore it or cleverly work to convert it into a learning aid that more
or less complements their own practices. If the teacher is willing to
cooperate (and by now most are), then students in large numbers
remain all too happy to treat a traditional doctrinally-focused course,
especially in the second and third year, as a slow-moving, relatively
painless aural and video device that repeats and reinforces the very
same information that students basically get through their own potpourri of materials and drills. In fact, you sometimes wonder whether
today's teachers haven't themselves become the very emotional crutch
that they still consider outlines, notes, and hornbooks to be for law
students trying to master how to learn and how to use legal doctrine.

as the seasoned student's only study material. Students are sometimes especially lucky to discover
that the very law teacher who taught that course they ignored throughout the semester is also the

author of one of the popular comnfercial outlines, thus making successful dependence on such materials
even more assured. A group of enterprising former law students has even reduced the various courses
typical of a legal education to collections of flashcards. See "Law In A Flash" flashcards.
27. And still others seem to hold both views. See, e.g., D'Amato, The Decline and Fall of
Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism, 37 J. LEA. EDUC. 461 (1987).
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If we pay close enough attention to student practices, I think
we can discern more than just a telling critique of the current doc-

trinally-preoccupied training regime. What students actually do in
learning how to learn and how to use legal doctrine suggests a partial

outline of a new curricular training regimen that would not only
make room for much neglected theory (and practice) but would also
do a better job of teaching the very legal doctrine so dear to current

pedagogical aspirations. Students apparently learn much of what
they have to know about how to learn and how to use doctrine
much earlier than law teachers acknowledge. 28 From that point forward, what they most need in commanding doctrine are sophisticated
information transfer mechanisms. That's why they do their best to
gather and create relevant outlines and practice problems, and that's
why they do their best to reward those teachers who accommodate

the classroom to this ambition.
Nothing's wrong with information transfer, and nothing's wrong
with law teachers playing a central role in making information transfer work and work well. Information transfer can be a centerpiece
of a good legal training regime-particularly when it makes available
patterns of doctrinal thought, skepticism about intellectual coherence, and connections to interdisciplinary thought and practical concerns. And, after all, part of a teacher's job is to make ideas
accessible, and to design formats to reinforce, confirm, and refine
what students begin to pick up as part of their own working knowledge. But, if you're going to do a good job of transferring infor-

mation, you've got to accept it as part of your job and you have

28. Surveys of students at Harvard Law School seem to support my conclusion. Third year
students there view the second and third years of legal education as little more than "marking time"
because "by the second year the students have learned the law school process." That legal education
becomes a rote exercise for students early on seems evident in the Harvard students' responses to
numerous questions. Asked whether they found first year law school "interesting" or "boring", 13%
of first year students responded boring or generally boring with some periods of interest; for second
years this figure rises to 33.4% and for third years, 42.6%. How quickly law students learn "how
to learn law" can be measured, perhaps to some degree, by their approach to course work. When
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the proposition that one can get as good a grade by
cramming as by consistent study, 26.4% of first years agreed, as compared to 54.2% of second years
and 77.6% of third years. These figures support both how rapidly students learn how to master
doctrine and how much legal education has failed in its attempts to challenge students to make
productive use of their academic time. See Michelman Report, supra note 1, at 5-12.
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to pay close attention both to the nature of the information and to
the evolving needs of your students.
Law teachers have a ways to go on both counts. If they really
understood how much they now transfer information about doctrine,
would they really insist that so much had to happen orally in the
classroom? Isn't it clear, and aren't students telling them, that in
many ways they might accomplish even more by efficiently putting
all they have to say in writing? Isn't it imaginable that the proper
kind of written materials (including certain central cases themselves;
text that identifies, historically situates, and deconstructs stocks of
storylines; arguments and policy concerns; written exercises that require students both to practice using what they've studied and then
to compare their work against practitioner-competent ("model") responses) could get in all the repetition and reinforcement and confirmation and nuances and jokes, so that all that would be missing
would be the elusive aural aspect of the transmission? And couldn't
teachers take care of that anyway by supplementing the reading and
the exercises with some very limited number of class sessions, class
sessions focused specifically on the irreducible functions that written
material can't perform?
In any event, student practices strongly imply just how much
time now devoted to teaching legal doctrine might well be redirected
to other matters. There's plenty of room for paying serious attention
to diverse theoretical thought in the curricular effort to make available to students both the origins and influence of legal knowledge
that they are attempting to make their own. And, for that matter,
there's plenty of room for paying serious attention to more diverse
skills training as a way of examining the mundane and majestic
aspects of practice. Accepting and taking advantage of these possibilities would seem a self-evidently mature and sensible reaction
to what doctrinal learning is now all about in this country's law
schools. Not to respond to what students for the last fifteen years
have been trying to tell us about legal education is, in many ways,
what seems most inexplicable and even irresponsible.
Too little of everyday life makes its way into and gets serious attention in the general approach to legal education.
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Theory and skills are not the only aspects of thought and practice
sacrificed to doctrine. So too is everyday life. Too little of what
people do and think and feel and too little of how institutions work
and change and get reinvented makes its way into the curriculum.
On the whole, law school materials, exercises, projects, and conversations tend to abstract away from both daily routine and rich
description and to position students (and faculty for that matter) at
a considerable distance from the very human events with which law
and lawyers regularly deal. Too much of legal education seems, in
short, schematic, ungrounded, and bloodless.29
Many not only share my conclusion but find it thoroughly unsurprising. Does anyone really expect legal education to seem any
different, they ask, when the very appellate cases that it so regularly
attends to are themselves so schematic, ungrounded, and bloodless?
Think about it, they say. In the legal culture the appellate court's
distance from the heat of conflict and from the pathology of failed
ventures is hailed as a distinctive virtue-indeed as a principal source
of a judge's authority and the legal system's legitimacy. Qualities
obviously so highly valued in appellate legal decision-making tend
to rub off on both those who teach through and those who learn
from appellate cases-not just because teachers and students tend
to see themselves more as judges than as practitioners (though they
do), but because curiosity about the messy, insoluble byproducts of
relationships seems only to get in the way of the studied effort to
replicate what those in law prize as the highest form of legal reasoning. Make anyone read, talk about, and deploy too many appellate cases, they say, and you'll see them inevitably move away
from everyday life-away from detail, away from context, and away
from passion.
This account, though perhaps exaggerated at least in focus, does
resonate with my own experience over the last eighteen years. Legal
29. Abstracting law both from human events and from the emotional responses which those
events should spark implicates serious political concerns. See Tushnet, supra note 11 at 276. For a
more general discussion of distancing of law from human realities and events, see Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to
the Teaching of Law, N.Y.U. L. REv. 514, 520 (1978); BEcoMoIN A LAwYER: A HuISANIsTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALIsM 33-46 (E. Dvorkin, J. Hammelstein, eds. 1981).
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education's fetishization of appellate cases has tended, so far as I
can tell, to reproduce in both students and teachers a discernable
(if sub-articulated) disdain for everyday life. Too many students and
too many teachers can't imagine needing or even wanting to know
more factual detail about a situation than formal law itself finds
plausibly relevant. Too many students and too many teachers can't
imagine needing or even wanting to understand how traditions of
thought and experience shape personal and institutional behavior.
And too many students and too many teachers can't imagine needing
or even wanting to learn how particular legal decisions penetrate
community arrangements and routines. 0
Still, over the years I've come to believe that these consequences
result almost as much from a failure to apprehend what appellate
cases can tell you as from the failure to appreciate what they can't.
Appellate cases-the published opinions of courts rendering a decision in connection with a particular litigated dispute-can serve as
one rich account of institutional and social life. Perhaps they are
a skewed sample of failed relationships and failed ventures. Still,
appellate cases help make available to students versions of how the
legal culture operates, how it transforms and responds to human
stories of conflict and failed ventures, how it legitimates and gives
prominence to certain arguments and not others, how it interacts
with other available remedial audiences (formal and informal), and
31
how it perceives itself by contrast to other regimes of political power.
But appellate cases are often not understood or used in this way.
Teachers often severely edit them in casebooks and in reading materials; they convert potentially rich ethnographic finds into crude
reductions. Even when appellate cases are not heavily edited, teachers and students tend all too frequently to treat them essentially as
the stick figures of doctrinal explication-as illustrations of legal
nuances rather than as instances of everyday life being shaped by
and influencing law in all its full political entanglements. In so do-

30. For a discussion of how the case-law method of teaching instills in law students a tendency

to abstract the cases studied from the social context in which they occurred, see Halpern, On the
Politics and Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL
31. See Anderson, supra note 7, at 280-86.

EDUC.
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ing, teachers regularly miss opportunities to encourage and students
miss the chance to practice the imaginative speculation so central
to good problem-solving. And, ironically, teachers also may well
encourage in students a bad version of the very case reading and
deployment skills they themselves so highly prize. Through habits
of heart and mind, teachers and students too often destroy or deny
what appellate cases might teach about life in and even out of the
legal culture.
Though there is unrealized potential in teaching about everyday
life through appellate cases, there are also real limits. Appellate cases
can undertell a story. For example, if you read Hitchman Coal and
Coke Co. v. Mitchell,3 2 you will learn from that 1917 Supreme Court
decision that the United Mine Workers were enjoined from interfering with individual ("yellow dog") contracts by which coal operators in West Virginia prohibited employees from joining unions.
But you won't learn from reading the case itself that this injunction
was only part of a well-orchestrated "law and order" campaigna campaign instigated by coal operators and aided by the state police
and United States troops, a campaign designed generally to defeat
the coal miners' efforts to gain some measure of control over and
safety in their workplace, and a campaign specifically calculated to
drive the United Mine Workers out of West Virginia. 3
Appellate cases not only can undertell a story, they can even
mislead, however unintentionally. Hitchman, for example, tells you
almost nothing about the workaday lives of the miners themselvesthe very workaday lives that made control over and safety in the
mines a matter of such passionate political concern, really a matter
of life and death. For example, you certainly won't learn from the
case how coal was mined in 1917-how, in that age before the advent
of mechanized strip mining, miners descended into tunnels to drill
and blast the coal from the face arid load it in cars to be shipped
to the mine entrance, all the while with coal dust covering their
32. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
33. For a better understanding of the social context in which Hitchman Coal And Coke Co.
v. Mitchell was decided, see R.

LUNT,

LAW

& ORDER v. TnE MINERS:

EVSTVIRGINIA,

1907-1933

(1979).
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skin, sifting into their clothes, and finally, into their lungs. And
you certainly won't learn from the case that mine accidents killed
on average more than 100 miners per month. And of course you
won't learn about how "black lung" disease slowly killed uncounted
thousands of others, since in 1917 and for decades later, the official
line of the operators (and their doctors) was that coal dust was a
4
healthy influence, an antidote to silicosis.1
In response to these limits, some have tried to integrate into legal
education versions of everyday life beyond those found in appellate
cases. Certain casebooks in traditional courses try in some genuine
(though typically quite limited ways) to reach beyond appellate decisions to expose students to certain background information-to
surrounding political events, social circumstances, and economic
forces. And,obviously, those "clinical courses" that provide the opportunity to do either supervised work with actual clients or simulated work with fictional clients have done much, if only for a
limited number of students, to bring detail, context, and passion to
law school training. But, as I've said, "clinical courses" remain
peripheral to the basic curriculum, and insofar as I've been able to
determine, the more a casebook reaches systematically beyond appellate cases, either to accounts of actual events and behavior or to
richly detailed hypothetical problem sets, the greater its chances are
of failing in the casebook market. Courses and casebooks that attend
at all carefully to everyday life may be admired, but they aren't
much rewarded-at least not by those who run law schools and law
publishing companies.
Ultimately, this aversion to everyday life in law school training
is both less defensible and more costly than it might first appear.
With any sort of ingenuity and industry, teachers find a wide range
of materials and people on which to draw and to develop in bringing
to legal education the experiential dynamics of institutional and social life. They can begin with the rich ethnographies, the provocative
histories, the detailed studies and the telling biographies they have
so long neglected. What they can't find in these materials they might

34. See Lunt, supra note 33, at 13-14.
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well find in less traditional sources-in recorded oral accounts, in
plays, in documentaries. And what existing materials can't provide
is to be discovered in people themselves-in students, in staff, in
the diverse groups that make up the surrounding local communities,
in lawyers of every sort, and even in faculty members.
What we pay for neglecting to use and develop these resources
goes far beyond the repetition, the flatness, the boredom, and the
ennui that many now associate with legal education, particularly in
the second and third year. As long as far too little of everyday life
makes its way into and gets serious attention in the general approach
to legal education, we can expect that too many of our future lawyers will continue to believe that they do their best work only and
always at a distance from and without a deep appreciation for those
with whom they work. Maybe that's all we ever expected from lawyers and legal education, but maybe it's what we've had to settle
for.
Too little conversation and too little coordination, simultaneous and
sequential, mark the general approach to legal education.
Even if many law teachers don't pay close attention to practice,
to theoretical literature, or to everyday life, you might at least expect
that most do know a great deal about and talk a great deal about
what's going on in their own curriculum. But I think you'd be disappointed and more than a little befuddled by what goes on behind
the scenes. Law teachers know how to grouse to one another about
grading examination bluebooks, how to complain to one another
about secretarial help, how to moan to one another about certain
pushy students, and, of course, how to gossip about Harvard (and
maybe even about one another). But by and large, law teachers don't
appear to think much about and certainly don't talk to each other
much about precisely what's going on in their own courses and their
own teaching. And as a group they seem never to have figured out
how to learn about and how together to do something about the
training they provide and the collective impact they have on their
own students and on the communities their students ultimately serve.
More is at stake here than some simple desire to see law teachers
be chummier with one another. When teachers don't talk, the poshttps://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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sibilities for sensible coordination-simultaneous or sequential-are
severely limited. How can teachers who teach the same first year
students sensibly coordinate when they don't even know exactly what
and exactly how they variously teach? How can teachers who teach
courses that students perceive as related and sequential-say Business
Organizations and Business Planning or Constitutional Law and
Constitutional Rights Litigation-coordinate, except in the crudest
sense, if they don't learn about and discuss what each does and
might do with their respective materials and in their respective classrooms? You can't lay groundwork for, you can't build on, you can't
reinforce, you can't refine, and you can't enrich as teachers unless
you know what others around you are doing.
Moreover, when teachers don't talk regularly about how and
what they teach it becomes increasingly difficult for them even to
see themselves as a team with a collective impact on students and
on clients and on the practice of law. If there are many law teachers
in many law schools who would welcome "a strengthening of collaboration, of vocational bonds, of a sense of joint venture and
shared enterprise," 35 there are at least as many who know that working in a group can be hard and time-consuming. Who in their right
mind wants to do hard and time-consuming group work when one
can no longer even imagine why working together is a necessity or
an obvious benefit? Perhaps, as some surmise, law teachers don't
"talk teaching" because they are difficult, unusually solitary, and
fearful of intrusions on academic freedom. But they also may not
talk teaching because over the decades they've collectively forgotten,
culturally and constitutionally forgotten, that talking to one another
might make a big difference to how they conceive of and feel about
their jobs and themselves.
Too many law teachers, I'm afraid, have largely abandoned collective responsibility both for the curriculum as a whole and for the
experience of students who progress through their own law schools.
They're content just to cruise along, mastering over time how to fit
into the curriculum, how to get what they want out of it, and how
35. See Michelman, The Partsand the Whole: Non-Euclidean CurricularGeometry 32 J.
EDUC. 352, 356 (1982).
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not to draw too much attention to themselves, except of course
where flattery is a distinct possibility. On some days it even feels
like the only time some teachers don't acquiesce in the general approach to legal education is when they rise up to oppose change.
In any event, too little talk about and too little coordination of
curricular matters together makes much of what law teachers do
cooperatively about teaching seem like so many empty-headed professional courtesies.

Were I to tell you nothing more I'd still think it appropriate for
you to conclude with me that legal education is a stubborn underachiever. Perhaps this perception explains why legal education is
attacked today as being both too long and too short. Three years
is way too long for students to put up with a faculty (and hence
a curriculum) that focuses efforts again and again on the same ideas
and skills through the same limited teaching methods. And, at the
same time, three years is way too short for students to get what
they need out of a faculty (and hence a curriculum) that doesn't
accommodate the efficient enhancement of knowledge or the cultivation of relevant competencies. The whole of legal education, as
one wise critic has observed, comes to something less than the sum
of its parts. 36 And, I might add, it amounts to something less than
an exquisite lesson for law students on how professionals might learn
to criticize and reimagine their own work as they progress through
their careers.
But I do plan to tell you more about what we do and how we
do it in legal education and I do hope that what I have to say moves
you beyond just a passing "academic" concern and closer still to
a commitment to action. We're now ready to talk about the criticism
of legal education that, in part, inspired these lectures: the insistently
generic vision of the world that pervades law school curricula. Though

36. Id. at 354.
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I feel strongly about all that I already have reported, you may sense
that I feel even more passionately about what I now have to say.
Perhaps this simply reflects that these observations illuminate much
of what I've already said-give it more bite, deeper roots, greater
cognitive and political coherence. But there's no doubt that, when
I think back on what bothered me the most as a law student and
what saddens me most about my own teaching over the past ten
years, what I have to say today feels both especially galvanizing and
especially chastening.
Too Generic a Vision of People, Traditions, and Experiences Pervades the General Approach to Legal Education.
You may never have noticed it. Or you may have noticed it and
never given it a name. Or you may have noticed it, named it, and
nevertheless acquiesced in it. In any event, I think it undeniable that
legal education conceives of and treats people-their traditions, their
experiences, their institutions-as essentially generic. It declares, at
least tacitly, that who particular people are-how they live, how
they struggle, how they suffer, how they interact with others, how
others interact with them, and how they relate to conventional governmental and corporate power-either need not be taken into account or may be treated as a fungible matter in training lawyers.
And legal education declares this, I think, over and over again
through its largely unchallenged general approach, through its limited models of teaching and learning, through its disdain for all but
a small number of skills, through its neglect of interdisciplinary theoretical ideas, through its disregard of everyday life, and especially
through its lack of coordination. Legal education teaches law students to approach practice as if all people and all social life were
homogeneous .~

37. This is true despite the fact that, by virtue of the type of legal work they choose, different
lawyers will serve different types of people with considerably different life experiences and needs. For
example, a study of Chicago lawyers conducted in the late 1970's indicated that for practitioners
engaged in "personal plight" work (civil rights, criminal defense, divorce, general family practice and
plaintiff-side personal injury), 34% of the client group could be classified as "blue collar." By contrast,
in practices engaged in general corporate work, only 6% of clients were blue collar. And practices
engaging in general corporate work received 43% of their business income from major corporate
clients (those with over $10,000,000 in annual sales), while those involved in "personal plight" work
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Maybe you find this hard to swallow. Perhaps you're thinking
that the very existence of certain course offerings challenges my
claim. A Law and Mental Health course and a Civil Rights course,
to take two obvious examples, almost by necessity would seem to
introduce human diversity into the study of and conversations about
law and lawyering. So too, one imagines, would courses like Family
Law and International Human Rights. But, at most schools, these
courses are not only preoccupied with doctrinal structure and detail
but are also preoccupied in a way that diminishes the relevance of
the particular identity and nature of the people and institutions involved. The differences that account, in large part, for who we are
and what we do are seldom pursued in a deep or particularly detailed
way either in these or in any other courses, let alone in the curriculum as a whole.
You might nonetheless be thinking that the mere range of appellate cases covered in any particular course itself insures that at
the very least some attention will be paid to particular people and
particular institutions. And, of course, you'd be right. In a typical
first year Contracts course, for example, you will most likely run
into both a case about the "conscionability" of a poor woman on
welfare buying an expensive stereo set on very exacting credit terms
from a regional retailer 8 and a case about the fairness of holding
multinational corporations to agreements vulnerable to the 1973
OPEC actions.3 9 But though students sometimes are asked to imagine themselves in the position of either a poor woman (of color) in
1962 in the District of Columbia or in the position of the Chair of
the Board committing the corporation to a long-term supply arearned only 10% of their income from this source. See J. HEn'z & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
Tm SocIAL STRucTaR oF Tm BAR 70, Table 3.2 (1982). Lawyers who choose to work in legal
services encounter a clientele markedly different from the clients encountered by those working in

other settings. For starters, 68% of legal service clients are women. And, at least in a sample program
funded by the Legal Services Corporation, only 21.7% of the clients served listed employment as a
major source of income. See LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1979). See
also Abel, Law Without Politics: Legal Aid Under AdvancedCapitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474, 55056 (1985).
38. Williams v. Walker Thomas, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
39. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc. 449 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980);

cases involving the Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts litigation such as Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 579 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1978).
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rangement, they will almost never be equipped-given the information and the time-to think either in a sustained or serious way
about what life for either that poor woman (of color) or that Board
Chair is actually like and how that bears on contractual obligation.
Even when diverse cases do turn attention deliberately toward the
"parties," the assessment too often has the feel of very thinly informed psycho-babble. Far too regularly law school training makes
observations about specific people and institutions that might well
be about any person and any institution-which is to say, about no
real person or real institution that exists anywhere in the world.
All future lawyers and all future clients suffer as a result. In a
profession already dominated by concepts like "reasonable man"
and "economic man," this generic vision of the world makes it
easier for law students to know little and to care less about the
institutions and the people with whom they'll work as lawyers.
Though law students may never come to believe that people and
institutions are in fact interchangeable, they may come to accept
that the very same differences that seem to matter a great deal to
a client matter little to the law and to the good lawyer. More perversely, even if law students thought differences should matter to
their own lawyering and to the legal culture, they may find themselves as lawyers ill-equipped to give life to their own ideas of practice. After all, a curriculum pervaded by a generic vision of the
world is hardly a likely place for future lawyers to identify and
develop the intellectual sensibilities and skills necessary to a practice
that values and responds to social diversity. And the unacknowledged consequence of such a curriculum may well be the exasperation that a client feels when he or she contemplates challenging a
lawyer's perception of his own work.
Not many of today's business lawyers and not many of their
clients, for example, would claim that law school prepared these
lawyers for most of what they do in the practice of law. 4° If pressed

40. For a discussion of legal education's failure adequately to train students for the practice
of business law, see Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L. J. 239, 303-06 (1984). See also generally Klayman & Nesser, Eliminatingthe DisparityBetween
the Business Person'sNeeds and What is Taught in the Basic Business Law Course, 22 Am. Bus. L.
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about what is lacking in recent graduates that makes them unprepared for real lawyering, most would agree that it is an understanding or even curiosity about the very diverse economic relationships
they must now help their clients arrange-a condition that can be
traced directly to the curriculum's generic vision of the world, which
serves to dull rather than sharpen lawyers' instincts for diversity of
any kind. But remarkably few lawyers, much less clients, have laid
this systematic failure of professional training at the door of the
law schools. To an extent perhaps unmatched in any other profession, they have come to rely instead on formal and informal onthe-job training to fill the void.
For lawyers who plan to work with subordinated people in the
fight for social change, the situation is far more desperate. These
lawyers and clients not only lack the elaborate structures for postlaw school training that fill the needs of business clients, but also
find far less within the generic curriculum that even remotely approaches their interests and concerns. A closer look at what the
generic curriculum does and does not offer for lawyers planning to
work in these settings-with business clients and with subordinated
people-reveals that while all future lawyers and all future clients
suffer under this generic legal education, they don't suffer equally.
The experience of generic legal education, however much it lacks in
vision, focus, and coordination, is far better suited to the world of
business and business lawyers than to the world of subordinated
people and the lawyers with whom they work. Indeed, in this sense,
its failure for the very people for whom it is most clearly intended
to work underscores the essential blindness of the generic vision.
Two of my Stanford colleagues have concluded that the training
of business lawyers can be fairly described as the "stepchild of legal
education. '41 Even if the rhetoric is hyperbolic, there's real bite to
this criticism, particularly if you assume that legal training should
J. 41 (1984) (survey of needs and preferences of business people and topics covered in business law
courses); Dunfee, Brennan & Decker, The Business Law Curriculum: Recent Change And Current
Status, 18 Am. Bus. L.J. 59 (1980) (survey of the status of business law courses); J. HENNINO & J.
HAMBLY, CORPORATE CLIENTS & TnEim LAWYERS: A COLLOQUY, 121-27 (1986).
41. Campbell & Gilson, The Law and Business Program at Stanford Law School 2 (Sept. 29,
1987) (internal memorandum to Stanford Law School faculty).
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be designed to produce "superbly qualified business lawyers, capable
of analyzing business problems and thus anticipating the need for
legal advice." ' 42 The training afforded future business lawyers in generic legal education has traditionally focused on appellate court
decisions and on government regulations of business transactions.
In Business Organizations, Securities, and Tax law courses students
learn doctrine and, to varying degrees, about the "pathologies of
failed ventures" that appellate caselaw represents. 43 Then in the other
business courses available in most curricula students learn more of
the same-they study regulations, doctrine, and failed venturesonly this time in other (somewhat random) substantive areas like
Oil and Gas or Bankruptcy.
Now, there's much to be learned from studying failed ventures,
but not if your only source is (usually highly edited) appellate case
law and not if you tend to focus principally on the doctrinal implications of this caselaw rather than on lessons about both the
business world and the practice of law. There is also much to be
gained from examining both regulatory schemes and forms of business organizations, but not if you fail systematically to examine the
interaction between the two and the effects of this interaction on
what those in business may be trying to accomplish. But legal education's failure to do a good job teaching either about the pathologies of failed ventures or about the interaction between
regulatory schemes and business forms is only symptomatic of its
real problem in training future business lawyers.
Legal education fails because it never really pays close attention
to what those in business and to what business lawyers actually do
in this world. It fails because it insists on treating people and institutions generically. It is no new revelation that business people
and firms try to plan and execute their own business relationships
in the midst of conflict over resources and goals and with the help
of imperfect information. And people should know that business
lawyers, at least the better ones, try to help their clients achieve
effective solutions under these other-than-ideal conditions. Knowl42. Id. at 1.
43. Id.
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edge of legal doctrine, knowledge of regulatory schemes, knowledge
of business forms, and knowledge of past failed ventures all matter
both to those in business and to their lawyers. But what legal education fails systematically to acknowledge and integrate into its
training is that all this knowledge matters in ways highly specific to
the industry, to the parties and to the deal. And it matters only
insofar as it variously affects the effort by those in business and
their lawyers to arrange relationships in life's imperfect circumstances. For legal education of future business lawyers to make sense,
it would have to make the arrangements, the activities, the practices,
and the risks of particular business worlds focal points around which
to build and coordinate a training regimen. That's right-it would
have to treat those in business and business lawyers anti-generically.
Now there is something curious about this, particularly if you
know anything about the funding structure of most law schools. If
legal education is systematically failing to meet the needs of its most
powerful clientele, why isn't someone raising a ruckus? Why are
lawyers, clients, and law schools conspiring or at least acquiescing
in this debacle? The answer lies deep in the very nature of law school
and professional legal culture in this country. What you'll find, if
you're at all honest, is that the experience of generic legal education,
for all its failure to prepare students for work in the world of business and business lawyers, is very much of that world. It is part
and parcel of a still largely closed system in which lawyers are not
trained for their work so much as socialized and selected for membership in a pretty exclusive club.
Let me explain. Law schools may not do a very good job of
training future business lawyers, but they do a perfectly sound job
of socializing a great many law students to the role of neophyte
business attorney. Indeed, in terms of what counts as knowledge,
in terms of what's valued as success, in terms of how to behave
and advance, and in terms of what's comfortable and familiar along
the dimensions of race, gender and class, one could hardly find a
better socializing experience for future business lawyers than law
schools in this country. 44 Whom business lawyers deal with and what
44. Perhaps this is more obviously true of "elite" schools (whose graduates go to work pre-
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business lawyers deal with bear a real kinship with whom and what
that matter in
law students deal with in legal education (and for
45
country.
this
in
almost all higher level education)
And what future business lawyers don't learn through generic
legal education by and large rarely hurts those in business, at least
not those in big business and at least not immediately and in any
direct way. Those in big business are quite well defended against
the not-terribly-well-trained (though very-well-socialized) young lawyer. They have developed systems of elaborate, almost ecclesiastical,
mechanisms that drastically limit a young lawyer's responsibility,
autonomy, and contact with clients. These systems just so happen
to serve the bottom line of most law firms (though not always most
clients) so that they are embraced, if perhaps for somewhat different
reasons, by both those experienced in business and those experienced
in business lawyering.
Somewhere along the line those in business and business lawyering began to promote these defense systems as well-conceived
training regimens for the young business lawyer. In fact, at some
point it also became rather commonplace for law teachers to trumpet
this entire arrangement as wonderful-indeed as indispensable-postlaw school education for all lawyers, not just those who want to
be business lawyers. 6 Now, to be sure, there are indications that at
least some business law firms have in recent years worked harder
at establishing solid training programs for the young lawyers they
hire. Whether or not they've done this in order to get better reviews
in the American Lawyer, they're obviously beginning to pay some
notice both to their own experience with associates and to what
young lawyers are telling them they need. And it is not hard to
figure out why many in law teaching, who themselves spent a few

dominantly in large corporate firms) than"local" schools (whose graduates generally end up in small

firms or as solo practitioners). See, e.g., HEiNz & LAUMANN, supra note 37, 192-93.
45. See D. KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HmiacaY: A

POLEMC

AGAINsr THE SYsTEM (1983). For a critique of Kennedy's views, see G. Peck, Reproduction, Resistance,
& Class in Legal Education: A Friendly Critique of Duncan Kennedy (forthcoming 1989).
46. See Campbell & Gilson, supra note 41; Cramton, The CurrentState of the Law Curriculum,
32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 326 (1982) for illustrations of this notion that large law firms successfully
compensate for the drawbacks of legal education by providing skills training for young associates.
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years at these firms before joining faculties, would praise the nice

fit between what law schools do in generic legal education and what
business law firms do later. Perhaps with good reason, those who
teach law see themselves as able and see their own career paths as

wise.
But if there are reasons to value the education some receive at
business firms, there are also good reasons to be skeptical of the
conventional wisdom about the unparalleled quality of training to
be found there. You don't have to be a pedagogical whiz to conclude
that a system designed both to protect business clients from the

perceived ignorance of young lawyers and to make money for law
firm partners is not likely to be a well-conceived training program.
And you don't have to be very perceptive to pick up from former

students that one memo-writing assignment after another-unconnected to the overall transaction, out of touch with the client, and
severed from the related brainstorming and decision making-hardly
makes for increased sophistication and judgment. And you don't
have to be a deeply anti-capitalist cynic to wonder why so many
associates for some reason or another just so happen never to make
partner-whether or not they're any good. 47

47. If anything, the training and reward system for associates at these firms appear to operate
counter-productively in terms of what the firms themselves believe it takes to be a "strong partner."
The system, for example, rewards convention instead of innovation, following instead of leading,
servicing partner needs instead of client needs. For observation about some of the limitations of law
firm training of associates, see Henning, Training Your Firm's Lawyers: The Future is Here, I J.
PROF. LEGAL ED. 39, 39-41 (December 1983). Even assuming that large law firms do provide adequate
supplemental training, this would hardly be a persuasive defense of generic legal education given the
low number and make up of law school graduates who actually work in these institutions. Because
national and regional law schools provide the great bulk of lawyers working in large business law
firms, and because most working class and minority students attend local law schools, few of these
students benefit from whatever training large law firms do provide. See Cramton, supra note 46, at
325; HiN~z & LAumANN, supra note 37, at 192-93. This is especially important since minority law
graduates form a substantial part of the core of lawyers who will work with the subordinated. This,
of course, is simply part of a bigger picture that casts some doubt on the likelihood of big firm
know-how ever being put to use for, and reaching, subordinated groups. At least in Heinz and
Laumann's study of Chicago lawyers, only 3% of those lawyers engaged in legal work typically of
service to the politically and socially subordinated (civil rights, criminal defense, divorce family law
and plaintiff-side personal injury) were employed in large firms with more than 30 lawyers; 42%
engaged in such work were solo practitioners. See HEINZ & LAmMANN, supra note 37, at 70. And
there's reason to be skeptical about the familiar claim that those who will ultimately work with the
subordinated might begin their careers in large law firms. Heinz and Laumann's study indicates that
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And business clients and firms feel little concern about this state
of affairs for the same reason they feel relatively indifferent about

the failures of formal legal education, even in the absence of sophisticated adaptations to its limitations. They have long since learned

that enough young lawyers somehow will manage to get themselves
ready (at one firm or another) first to take on greater responsibility
and ultimately to replace the experienced lawyers and rainmakers.
In this sense, making it as a partner in certain business law firms
bears an uncanny resemblance to making it as an academic at most
law schools. Those better prepared by the accidents and perquisites

of life and status-those for whom adaptation to the standards for
entrance into the clubs is not really much of a "stretch" -will ascend
in disproportionate numbers into these positions. 48 No wonder at

all, really, why the upper reaches of large firms remain disproportionately white, male, and socially homogeneous.
The real point for our purposes, however, is that the world of
business has very sophisticated systems for adapting to the limits of
generic legal education. When they work well, the systems limit ex-

posure to the risks associated with giving too much responsibility
to novices presumed to be untrained along certain dimensions; they
exploit over and over again what new lawyers know how to do best
as a result of their law school training; and they market the professional experience in which they're set as not just a good but a

only 2.6% of solo practitioners (who constitute 42% of those serving the subordinated) begin their
careers as attorneys in large law firms and that 6.5% of all attorneys working at firms with less than
10 practitioners started out at large firms. Finally, the study finds that 0% of practicing government
lawyers (which includes legal services and public defender offices) began in a large firm. Id. at 195,
Table 6.5.
48. For a survey of problems confronting women in male-dominated business and professional
settings, see Rhode, Perspectiveson ProfessionalWomen, 40 STAN. L. Rav. 1163 (1988). For a relatively
extensive discussion of the effect of socioeconomic factors on a lawyer's career path, see HEiNz &
LAumANN, supra note 37, 167-208. The underrepresentation of women and minorities in large law
firms is striking. The National Law Journal'smost recent survey of the nation's "top" (i.e. largest)
250 law firms indicates that, among the 52 largest law firms in the state of New York, women and
minorities comprise 8% of the partners. Nationally, women and minorities comprise 10% of large
law firm partners. The numbers for individual law firms are often particularly jarring. For example,
of the 157 partners of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, New York's largest law firm, 12
are women, one is Black, one is Latino and none are Asian or Native American. Of the firm's total
of 661 attorneys, 198 are women, 12 are Black, five are Latino and 17 are Asian or Native American.
See 199 N.Y.L.J. I (February 29, 1988).
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necessary step for anybody serious about becoming a business lawyer. And, when they work well, the systems even draw praise and
support from many law teachers, if not because they actually believe
that law firms have a comparative advantage over law schools in
teaching about practice, then because they realize that these systems
permit them to continue doing exactly what they've always done in
this country's law schools.
But in contrast to future business lawyers and business clients,
subordinated people and those lawyers who plan to work with them
aren't nearly as well-served by generic legal education-by either the
curriculum or the socialization process-and aren't nearly so welldefended against its failures. In their efforts to change the world,
they find themselves and their work linked to an educational system
pervaded by a conception of practice fundamentally hostile to their
shared vocation, a conception of practice I call the "regnant idea
of lawyering for the subordinated." Moreover, at some level both
subordinated people and those lawyers who plan to work with them
sense that trying to escape this regnant idea, much less challenge it
with an alternative, is made all the more difficult because its largely
underarticulated characteristics have come to embody "what lawyers
do," both in the legal and popular culture. 49
The curricular lapses are glaring. Consider the obvious. Law
schools offer fewer courses (sometimes far fewer courses) for those
training to work with the subordinated than they offer for future
business lawyers. And whereas business courses are permanent fixtures in the legal curricula, courses offered about subordinated people often appear only spasmodically and often survive only for a
short time.50 For example, you'll often hear a law school faculty
announce that it is in desperate need of new or lateral hires to fill

49. For a description and critique of this conception of lawyering-what I call the regnant idea
of lawyering for the subordinated, see G. Lopez, Everyone Here Lawyers: The Rebellious Idea of

Lawyering Against Subordination, Chapter One, (forthcoming 1989).
50. And while business law courses are portrayed and perceived as rigorous, lawyer-like and
precise, the temporary and transient nature of those courses offered for those who plan to work with

the subordinated "conveys the message that they are neither central to the definition of lawyers' skills
. . . nor are they coherent. Rather, they are interstitial, mushy, political, ad hoc." Klare, The Law
School Curriculum In The 1980's: What's Left, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 336, 338 (1982).
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gaps in the business curriculum. But when is the last time you heard
a law school faculty proclaim itself in need (forget about desperate
need) of permanent tenture-track people to fill gaps in its curriculum
for training those who will work with the poor, and working poor,
people of color, women, the elderly, gays and lesbians?
The socialization process, too, runs diametrically opposed to the
needs of these future lawyers and clients. While lawyers who help
fight social and political subordination can undoubtedly learn things
from interacting with those who run and go to law schools-they
must, for example, know how to work in and deal with mainstream
culture, how to understand, how to interpret and influence what
those with conventional power think and do-the very same qualities
of law school life that serve effectively to socialize students to life
in the mainstream serve horribly as a means of teaching students
about life in subordinated communities.
Whatever else law schools may be, they remain intensely mainstream in terms of race, gender, and class; in terms of how authority
is exercised; and in terms of what counts as wisdom and insight.
Whatever else law schools may be, they are not where you go to
learn about how the poor live, about how the elderly cope, about
how the disabled struggle, and about how single women of color
raise their children in the midst of mediocre schools and inadequate
social support. Most of those people never get near making it into
law schools, let alone on to faculties. They may work on law school
staffs, and they certainly do fill jobs on the janitorial crews. But
whatever their presence on campus and whether they be janitors,
secretaries, students or faculty, it has not been my experience that
law school cultures or law students themselves value what subordinated people may have to teach about the world from which they
came or in which they now live. If anything, subordinated people
feel pressures in and around law schools to act white, straight, upper-class, and male.
This socialization unfortunately helps reinforce in those planning
to work with the subordinated the very same debilitating idea of
lawyering promoted by formal law school training. Generic legal
education methodically disciplines students not to immerse themselves in their clients' lives-to extract and attend to only that which
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is "legally" relevant in a situation, to disregard what other professional and lay people may be doing in response to problems, to
underappreciate what clients themselves may have done and may be
capable of doing. And generic legal education effectively persuades
students to think of themselves as the preeminent problem-solvers
in any situation, with little to learn from those around them-about
the worlds in which lawyers intervene, about constellations of strategies from which lawyers should be helping people to choose a course
of action, about the lasting practical effects, if any, of the lawsuits
lawyers so frequently file, about ways of reconceiving what lawyers
do in the fight for social change. In short, law school training inculcates patterns of professional practice that neatly correspond to
and embrace the forms of human association endorsed in law school
culture.
Inspiring in students a strong tendency regularly to ignore those
with whom they work is bad training for any lawyer. But somehow
it seems peculiarly troublesome for those future lawyers who plan
to work with subordinated communities. What kind of collaboration
with subordinated people can you reasonably expect from lawyers
systematically socialized away from subordinated communities and
methodically trained to pay as little attention to their clients as possible? And what kind of world can you fairly hope to bring into
existence through fights that almost "naturally" privilege the narrowest sort of lawyer know-how and that regularly dismiss what
subordinated people (and their other allies) know about life, about
problem-solving, and about change itself?
In a nutshell, then, both the curriculum and socialization process
of generic legal education are not just unproductive, but actually
counterproductive for lawyers who plan to work with those subordinated by social and political life. Moreover, unlike the business
world, there are no systems of elaborate defenses to shield subordinated people and their allies from the inadequacies of those young
lawyers with whom they work. Those upon graduation who will
work with the subordinated have to be ready actually to practice,
not just to take the bar and serve a long cloistered apprenticeship.
And people in the fight against subordination take what they can
get in the way of lawyers, if not in terms of raw smarts then certainly
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5

50

1989]

ANTI-GENERIC LEGAL EDUCATION
López: Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially

both in terms of numbers and in terms of trained and socialized
sensibilities.51 They immediately put each of these new lawyers to
work, sometimes on the most important tasks and in the most direct
and responsible ways, and sometimes in circumstances where they
are immensely vulnerable. They hope that a young lawyer will pick
up what she doesn't know and that she will pick it up quickly and
well. And then in many ways people in the fight against subordination simply roll the dice, trusting that a new lawyer's enthusiasm
and good intentions at least sometimes will outdistance thoroughly
inadequate preparation.
The failure to deal with real training needs is most visibly evident
in the continuing neglect of a range of knowledges and skills typically associated with dispute resolution and litigation. Whether we
like it or not, lawyers who work with the subordinated often find
themselves immediately enmeshed in disputes and more particularly
in formal remedial ceremonies, from relatively straightforward administrative hearings to relatively complicated trials.52 Unless legal
education systematically helps students to demystify these rituals, to
develop related skills and to ready themselves for the continuing
need to refine and extend those skills throughout their careers, then
you can be certain that subordinated people will suffer disproportionately.
Yet, if law teachers operating within generic legal education seem
relatively unresponsive to getting students ready to function in certain conventional settings, they seem blissfully unaware that even
solid training in traditional administrative and trial litigation badly

51. Recent experience here at Stanford Law School indicates that relatively few law graduates
are employed in work considered to be public interest. Of the 505 students who graduated between
1985 and 1987, only 21 began their careers working in positions potentially dedicated to lawyering
with the subordinated (legal services, public interest agencies, public defenders officers, and certain
progressive firms with fewer than 10 attorneys). While a significant percentage of Stanford students
accept judicial clerkships (28% in the class of 1987) and a fair share of these express and fulfill a
commitment later to work on behalf of the subordinated, the numbers are still disquieting. For an
internal report indicating similar percentages at the University of Michigan Law School, see Chambers,
Eklund & Krieger, A Changing Pattern of Placement After Law School (Sept. 8, 1987) (internal
memorandum to Lee Bolinger).
52. Most of us are all too familiar with the "baptism by fire" stories of those lawyering with
the subordinated in legal services and public defender office.
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misapprehends in many ways the needs and aspirations of subordinated people and the lawyers with whom they will work. Anticipating and responding to the problems of the politically and socially
subordinated demands a range of practical know-how and intellectual sophistication that extends beyond litigation competence. It demands knowing how to work with clients and not just on their
behalf; it demands knowing how to collaborate with allies rather
than ignoring their actual or potential role in the situation; it demands knowing how to take advantage of and how to teach selfhelp and lay lawyering and not just how to be a good formal representative; and it demands knowing how to be part of, as well as
knowing how to build, coalitions, and not just for purposes of filing
a lawsuit. In sum, anticipating and responding to the problems of
the politically and socially subordinated requires training that reflects
(and, in turn, helps produce) an idea of lawyering compatible with
a collective fight for social change-a "rebellious idea of lawyering"
at odds with the conception of practice that now reigns over legal
education and the work of lawyers.53
Perhaps the range of practical know-how and intellectual sophistication entailed in this rebellious idea of lawyering so escapes
law teachers precisely because it draws too heavily on what subordinated people themselves sometimes do in struggling to get by.
After all, the closer you get to identifying explicitly what lay people
might teach lawyers about practice, the closer you get to admitting
that thinking like a lawyer is in no sense discontinuous from everyday problem solving. Or, perhaps lawteachers pay so little attention
to this range of practical know-how and intellectual sophistication
specifically because it smacks so much of the work of other lessprivileged professions. After all, the more you champion an idea of
lawyering that entails conceptual and practical dimensions more typically associated with social workers or organizers, the more you

53. For an account of a young lawyer in a small private firm whose work with clients and
allies in a civil rights context reflects and aspires to this rebellious idea of lawyering, see Lopez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks In The Life Of A Rebellious Collaboration (forth-

coming in the 1989 GEo.

LAw

J.) and for an extensive elaboration of this conception of practice as

it might inform the vocation of radical and progressive lawyers and the lay and professional activitsts
with whom they labor, see Lopez, supra note 49.
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demystify and deprivilege what it is lawyers actually do. In any
event, training and socialization interact in generic legal education
in such a perverse way that it becomes an experience that those allied
in the fight against subordination (lawyers, clients, and everyone
else) must learn largely to overcome rather than to take advantage
of in their efforts to change the world.
Of course, those in the fight against subordination have developed some post-law school education in order to respond to perceived inadequacies in recent law school graduates. There are some
relevant continuing education courses for the bar; there are some
relevant how-to-manuals; and there are some simulated training
courses.5 4 But altogether it is too little and too uneven in quality,
even when young lawyers can afford to pay for it or have someone
else pay for it for them. Post-law school education earnestly aspires
to defend subordinated communities and their allies against inadequate training and socialization but with too few resources to inspire genuine confidence.
Worse still, post-law school education even when done well almost never extends outside the boundaries of litigation. Like the
three years of law school, it basically shuns entire dimensions of
practice integral to the needs of subordinated people and the lawyers
with whom they work. In fact, few law teachers can match the
dismissive rancor certain "public interest" and "legal services" attorneys evince at the mere mention of aspects of the rebellious idea
of lawyering against subordination-at the mere mention of collaboration with clients and allies, or of grassroots mobilization, or of
teaching self-help and lay lawyering. Maybe this antipathy reflects
an overwhelming workload or the lack of conventional resources,
or, more likely, the rigid structures and expectations that often envelop progressive practitioners. Whatever the reasons, too many of
these lawyers have internalized the very same idea of lawyering that
generic legal education teaches and that serves so inadequately for

54. For examples of publications designed to respond to inadequate legal education, see M.
& B. SCHOENFIELD, INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1981); NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
TRIAL ADVOCACY (NITA), MASTER ADVOCATES' HANDBOOK and other NITA publications.
SCHOENFIELD
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all those in the fight against subordination. 55 Worse still, they seem
all too willing to protect their own "achievements" by refusing to
extend the boundaries of both post-law school education and their
own conception of practice. In short, they have become, along with
law schools, part of the problem for the subordinated rather than
part of the solution.
III.

So WH:ERE Do WE Go FRoM HERFE? ANTI-GENERIC LEGAL
EDUCATION

All future lawyers and all future clients not only suffer under
the influence of the generic vision of the world, but suffer unnecessarily. There's ample space to be made in current law school curricula for paying attention to diverse traditions and experiences. And
there's a wealth of resources, conventional and unconventional, on
which to draw in bringing differences systematically to bear on legal
education. There's no good reason, in other words, for people to
remain colorless, genderless, classless; there's no good reason for
traditions and experiences to remain in the shadows or out of the
picture altogether; and there's no good reason for institutions to
remain unconnected to certain other institutions, to certain people,
to certain market forces, to certain histories and to certain political
impulses and pressures.
If what I've told you about legal education has been at all convincing, you shouldn't find it hard to agree with me on what generally we ought to shoot for in our efforts to improve legal education.
Our aim certainly would include that:
earlier learning should provide "core literacy" material upon
which later learning can and should draw;
-

- later learning should explicitly reinforce, extend and refine
earlier learning in ways students can identify and appreciate;

55. Though there are remarkably few studies of how progressive lawyers practice, those that
exist suggest that attorneys who work with the subordinated are, despite their generally left politics,
most likely to be autocratic decisionmakers-paradoxically collaborating far less with clients and allies
than business lawyers, a group perhaps least inclined to voice egalitarian and communitarian politics.
See, e.g., E. SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE, 144-74 (1986).
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earlier and later learning should be self-consciously coordinated so that teachers and students can respond to and shape how
courses fit together, one after another, side by side, and as a package;
-

earlier and later learning, both about law and about lawyering,
should be grounded in the situated lives and work of particular
people, lay and professional, and of particular institutions, small
and large; and
earlier and later learning should regularly include both interdisciplinary theoretical ideas and attention to a range of practical
knowledge.

While I could go on, you're probably already thinking about the
limits of general prescriptions. To understand why I think law schools
ought to move in the direction of anti-generic legal education is to
grasp how much each law school ultimately must attend to its own
affairs. Each law school must take stock of its own past and, along
with others, decide its own future. The school must ask itself who
it serves and feels responsible to, who it has trained in the past,
who it wishes to commit itself to training in the future, where its
former students have worked immediately following graduation and
over the course of the their careers, where it would like to prepare
students to go, and how it might respond to its evolving sense of
self in light of current and foreseeable resources and constraints.
Apart from the force of convention, there's little reason to think
that most law schools willing to think hard about these questions
would come up with identical answers. In fact, there are good reasons to hope that they wouldn't. I think different approaches to
training future lawyers will likely be more responsive to the needs
of different constituencies. Law schools, like the universities of which
they are usually a part, often have a ways to go when it comes to
making themselves responsible to what's going on around them. Discernible differences in the training offered by different law schools
will also likely be more conducive to continuing experimentation by
every institution, and today's institutions for legal education are not
often associated with subjecting their own operations to scrutiny and
challenge.
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Yet if the idea of anti-generic legal education makes sense, it
seems helpful, even now, for each law school to take a glimpse at
what every other school trying to rethink its curriculum is up to.
That glimpse is worthwhile, again, not so much because you can
expect another institution's specific ideas and actions to make perfect
sense for your own school but because detailed efforts themselves,
however ill-suited to easy adoption, often provoke discussion and
a healthy unrest. With that in mind, I'd like to draw on what's
going on at Stanford Law School, my home institution, as a way
of outlining for you what one version of anti-generic legal education
might look like.
In doing so I don't mean to claim that Stanford's current curriculum holds up very well in my own eyes; in fact, its weaknesses
obviously have prompted much of what I've tried to describe to
you. But I know our curriculum better than I do most others, and
it feels a little more comfortable talking specifically about necessary
changes in something that, along with my colleagues, I should be
held responsible for rather than speaking of something out of my
control. Anyway, there's some action at Stanford and maybe there's
something to be learned from it.
IV.

WHAT'S HAPPENIN G AT STANFORD

Two separate groups of Stanford Law School faculty, working
voluntarily and on an ad hoc basis, have focused, each in its own
way, on our past performance and on our future commitments. As
a result of this self-scrutiny and apparently as a result of consensus
around certain tentative answers, both groups are now trying to
reimagine and retool big chunks of the curriculum. One group is
working on a program to train business lawyers-at Stanford this
translates into lawyers who typically will work in (big) corporate
firms serving (big) corporate clients. Another group, of which I am
a part, is trying to design and implement a curriculum for those
who plan to work with subordinated people-which at Stanford
means lawyers who will work in a range of institutions (public interest firms, legal services offices, small progressive private firms,
government agencies, organizing projects) with a range of people
subordinated by social and political life (the poor and working poor,
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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women, people of color, the elderly, gays and lesbians, the disabled,
abused and neglected children). Each group of faculty is undoubtedly responding to its own interests and concerns as well as to its
reading of our current situation. But I think there's some underarticulated sense among a wider group of people, particularly those
students dedicated to each vocation, that these enterprises are long
overdue.
Though both groups have done some work and though parts of
future curricula are already in place, in many ways there's still a
long way to go. Each group of individuals must work its way through
to some common understanding of what to do; and each group of
individuals must come to share not only a view of how to do it but
a commitment that they will persevere to put it in place. There's
some reason to believe each group will succeed; there's a fair amount
of good will at this point in time, and Stanford has some56 history
of faculty working together to institute curricular change. Still, I
think the enterprises are fragile, if not perilous, partly because faculty don't regularly talk about and coordinate their teaching and
partly because the ideas now on the table, if pursued vigorously,
would alter much of what faculty (and everybody else) have come
to think of as ordinary.
While it would no doubt make for both interesting gossip, and
more importantly, fascinating anthropology, I am not going to talk
about our individual and collective insecurities and disagreementsthough I will certainly not deny them. And I'm not going to speculate about what those faculty members not involved in either group's
work think at this point in time about what's happening-though
no doubt there's both some interest and some anxiety. Instead, I
plan to outline my own vision of what each group should try to
design and implement-a vision produced in part by what colleagues
have taught me and a vision (at least in all its detail) shared, at this
point, by perhaps only a few others. Given my own involvement
and expertise, my outline of the curriculum for those planning to
work with the subordinated will be both more complete and more
56. For a brief description of a course created as part of such a collaborative effort, see Brest,
A First-Year Course in the "Lawyering Process," 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 344 (1982).
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detailed than my description of the business curriculum. But in both
instances I hope you'll get the picture of where I think we should
head in the effort to deliver an anti-generic education.
A.

The First Year
Each specialized curriculum should plan, I think, to offer an
initial package of mandatory "core literacy courses" in the spring
semester of the first year. In some ways, this is a matter of convenience. Because Stanford's curriculum currently requires spring
semester first year students to elect two or three courses from a
group of "perspective courses," there's a tradition of beginning upper-level courses, as it were, in the first year. And more than a few
people (myself included) don't want to mess right now with most
of the first semester curriculum-thinking that if you try to change
it too you'll end up either changing nothing or pouring all your
energy into these first semester courses. But I've come to believe
that, at least for us at Stanford, beginning specialized curricula in
the spring semester serves more than political convenience. It acknowledges an underlying sentiment that something about our first
semester, for all its current weaknesses, makes enough intellectual
sense not to abandon cavalierly, particularly now that it might be
followed by the two proposed curricula.
To understand this sentiment, you should know that, apart from
the somewhat unusual spring semester electives, there's nothing special about Stanford's first semester course offerings. You probably
could parachute some students down into any of thirty or forty (or
two hundred) first-year curricula around the country, and they
wouldn't be able to tell whether they were actually at Stanford. In
the first semester, students must take Research and Writing, Contracts, Torts, Civil Procedure and Criminal Law. In the second semester, students must take Research and Writing, Property and
Constitutional Law, but (as I've said) they also must choose two or
three electives from among a range of perspective courses, including
courses like History of American Law, Jurisprudence and Lawyering
Process. Though our student-faculty ratio is smaller than most other
schools, teachers do not in any valuable way coordinate, and the
"big classroom" method almost entirely dominates.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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1. Fall Semester
Still, for purposes of both specialized curricula, I think that for
now we should stick with-though work at dramatically improvingthe first semester's line-up. Whatever each teacher actually aspires
to, each first semester course currently serves to help train students
to learn how to learn and how to use legal doctrine and to help
expose students to how some things work for those enmeshed in the
law. This knowledge and these skills, in mature form, matter to
both business lawyers and to lawyers who plan to work with the
subordinated, and the fact that they are perhaps already adequately
transmitted through the current version of the first semester itself
suggests a modest defense of its serviceability as part of anti-generic
curricula. But, more importantly, current achievements provide the
partial outlines of a vision of the first semester that, contrasted with
what's now done, makes the courses better cohere both internally
and as a bridge to the proposed specialized curricula.
In this new vision, these first semester courses eventually might
serve as a richly coordinated introduction to law, lawyering and the
legal culture-an introduction that inevitably serves as an initiation
of sorts for future lawyers and as an experience through which they
might begin learning to be critical observers of what they find and
find themselves doing. Though much time would be spent exploring
the law of Contracts, Torts, Civil Procedure and Crimes and working at basic research and writing skills, equal time would be spent
exploring the legal culture of which each "substantive area" of law
is only a part and an illustration. Though students would still be
expected to get the knack of learning how to learn and how to use
legal doctrine, the central concern would not be "What is the law
of contract" but rather "What is it that lawyers do with people in
situations that might be characterized as a contract matter?"
For this vision to have a chance, those who teach these first
semester courses, particularly to the same students, would have to
work far more closely together-in fact, they would have to learn
how to operate as a team. They would have to emphasize the dynamics of lawyering as much as the intricacies of law; they would
have to integrate ideas wisely from other disciplines and from situated everyday life; they would have to reinvigorate the enterprise
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with a wiser mix of pedagogical methods; they would have to pay
explicit attention to how stories ("factual information") get gathered, refined and interpreted; they would have to redefine, perhaps
radically, the relationship between written materials, written exercises, and oral activities; and they would have to decide quite selfconsciously what constituted information transfer, what constituted
the "practice" of skills, and what constituted speculative criticisms
and vision.
And for this vision to become reality, students who take these
first semester courses would have to learn, even more than they do
today, to unlearn their expectations about what learning to be a
lawyer and what learning at law school should be about. They would
have to learn to reach beyond so called black letter law to interdisciplinary origins and influences; they would have to assume responsibility for taking full advantage of information-transfer
mechanisms; they would have to grow comfortable with and even
begin appreciating the exact and uncertain problem-solving that lawyering entails; and they would have to apprehend how much they
might learn not just from the teacher but, more importantly, from
one another and from their own past experiences and insights.
The changes this new vision of the first semester requires of
students and teachers would feel both exciting and difficult. Teachers, among other things, would at first no doubt have to spend
considerable time supplementing existing course casebooks with certain collectively designed materials and exercises. And students,
among other things, would have to refocus their energy in order to
do a decent job of integrating interdisciplinary ideas into their mastery of certain unfamiliar local doctrine. But, if my own experience
is at all indicative, both would feel rewarded not just by the excitement of it all but by the sense of coherence their joint efforts
would bring to the enterprise. Ultimately, though, the success of
this vision of the first semester would have to turn on more than
the rush that comes from the mere involvement in change-the Hawthorne effect has its limits. 5 7 It would depend upon the willingness

57. The existence of the Hawthorne effect was established by experiment at the Hawthorne

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5

60

1989]

ANTI-GENERIC LEGAL EDUCATION
López: Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially

of both teachers and students to follow through on what I believe
they would come to appreciate as necessary changes. Teachers, for
instance, would have to be willing at some point to abandon casebooks as we now know them-designed for one course with little
appreciation for what's going on in the other courses-and to design
(and market) fully integrated materials that simultaneously serve the
role of each course in the overall scheme. And students, at least
many of them, would have to be willing to shed the relatively passive
and academically nurtured "I learn what you tell me in the classroom" self-image that, in many ways, now defines their work at
law school, particularly during the first year. Though I am not entirely confident all this will happen, the possibilities that inhere in
this newly envisioned first semester make the effort worthwhile.
2.

Spring Semester

First year students in the spring semester at Stanford currently
must take Property and Constitutional Law and choose two or three
perspective courses from a select list of second and third year electives. Although the history of these requirements implies the existence of sophisticated (while perhaps somewhat inchoate and not
entirely compatible) rationales, most people today defend the system
in very straightforward terms. Property and Constitutional Law are,
they say, two more doctrinal courses students simply must take in
the first year. And, after so much doctrine parsing in the first semester, they add, students need some perspective in the second semester of the first year that can be provided through any of a small
number of mandatory electives.
By the normal standards of curricular justification, this explanation seems plausible enough. Can't you imagine the reasons for
thinking that Property and Constitutional Law are elemental to the
study of other areas of law? And who would argue against the idea
that perspective is a good thing in lawyers? Moreover, if you accept
the ambitions of generic legal education, the current spring semester

Works of the Western Electric Company in Indiana in 1962. The effect occurs when the subjects of
a study are aware of being under concerned observation and are thus stimulated "to output or accomplishment." WVEBsTEas NINTH NEw COLLE ATE DICTIONARY 557 (1988).
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even possesses some real attractions: it aspires to finish off the list
of perceived "must" doctrinal courses without at the same time
killing off in the first year's short nine months whatever intellectual
ambitiousness students began with in September. But if anti-generic
legal education at Stanford is to hang together, both in the business
curriculum and in the curriculum for those who plan to work with
the subordinated, then it must not only inform but build on what
takes place in the first semester. After experiencing the sort of firstsemester education I envision, or for that matter even after going
through what we now do, first-year students are plenty ready-and
in many ways need-to move on to the situated study of law and
lawyering that both specialized curricula envisage. All that we know
suggests that they've got a basic handle on how to learn and how
to use legal doctrine-at least I think they've learned pretty much
what they can of these skills through the typical "big classroom"
model of teaching and learning. And they've been exposed to variations of a certain sort of initiation into how the legal culture operates-again, at least I think they've been through those initiations
that the "big classroom" model easily can accommodate.
So what should we do? Carry on in the spring semester through
the vestiges of generic legal education? Or move more boldly into
what anti-generic legal education would seem to suggest? Unfortunately I fear that, in the short run, we may simply add certain
"basic literacy" courses for each of the specialized curricula to the
list of spring semester electives. First years will then pick what they
want to "major in" by taking these mandatory literacy courses, in
addition to the mandatory courses on Property and Constitutional
law. In effect, we will have then grafted anti-generic legal education
onto the remnants of the existing generic scheme and will just have
to go about the business of adjusting to it all. The resulting hybrid
would likely feel no worse-and my guess is would even feel much
better-than the hodge-podge students now experience. Still there
are good reasons for faculty ultimately to abandon-better still, to
avoid-this compromise. There's nothing magical about having to
learn either Constitutional Law or Property in the first year. They
may well be elemental to certain other courses, but surely in legal
education that proves too much. Law teachers are notorious for
secretly thinking that everything should be taught in the first year;
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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everything, after all, is elemental to everything else. Moreover, we
do have evidence that it wouldn't be a tragedy to move these two
courses out of the first year. Most other schools teach Constitutional
Law after the first year and several other schools have had a long
tradition of teaching Property as an upper-level course.
In fact, in an anti-generic curriculum I'm not at all certain Property should remain an intact course. It has always been, depending
on how you count, an odd combination of five to seven little minicourses. Why not just disaggregate it and move the pieces around
into more sensible places in the new curricula? You might, for example, transform certain historical and idiosyncratic parts-the Rule
against Perpetuities and the like-into self-teaching materials and
exercises. And you might shove landlord tenant doctrine into courses
that focus more fully on housing. You get the picture. It's not at
all obvious that, as a result of these changes, students would lose
any special coherence that the current Property course now offers,
and it seems likely that some materials lodged in the traditional
course would find a more comfortable home surrounded by related
ideas.
Anyway, with the introduction of the specialized curricula, there's
a real practical price to pay for maintaining Property and Constitutional Law as mandatory courses in the first year. If the new
curricula are going to work, they must make their spring semester
literacy courses mandatory; you've got to establish a basic language
and expertise on which to draw and build over the next two years.
That probably means that at the end of the first semester of the
first year students will be forced to elect between the two curriculathey already have to take Property and Constitutional Law, so they'll
have to choose for their so-called "electives" one or another set of
the core literacy courses. Now, by the end of the first semester, a
certain number of students will be ready to choose; indeed, over
time I suspect Stanford will begin to attract students precisely because they plan all along to take either the curriculum for those
planning to work for the subordinated or the curriculum for business
lawyers.
But it is also true that a certain number of students (perhaps a
large number at the outset, but decreasing in size over the years)
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won't feel comfortable closing off one track of learning so early in
their careers. Some of them will simply be on the fence about their
own futures. Others might simply want to partake extensively of
both curricula during their second and third years, even if they are
entirely committed to one or the other kind of work. Others still
might want to combine courses from each curricula in order to prepare themselves for particular future work. And still others might
want to devote their attention to one track but also be allowed to
choose from one of the existing spring semester electives rather than
being made to take both Property and Constitutional Law.
Nothing is inherently wrong with making students choose and
making those choices have consequences. To some degree, that's an
inevitable feature in specialized curricula that demand that students
take responsibility for past knowledge in order to extend and elaborate their expertise over the three years of law school. In fact,
having to make curricular choices with consequences might even
prove to be a healthy lesson for some of our students-those who,
in order "not to foreclose any future possibilities," seem never to
commit themselves to, or to get better at anything. But anti-generic
legal education isn't out to punish students and, unless there are
very good reasons, it doesn't wish to deprive them of opportunities
to participate in a richly sequential track of learning.
Unless I'm missing something, the reasons most people offer for
why Property and Constitutional Law should remain mandatory
spring semester courses just don't seem good enough to justify entirely cutting off students from one or the other of the specialized
curricula's core literacy courses. Nor do they convince me that first
year students should have to abandon perspective courses in their
spring semester (the inevitable consequence of making mandatory
both Property and Constitutional Law and core literacy courses). It
may be that the philosophy behind making perspective courses elective requirements, whatever its roots, seems now as blurry as it is
unobjectionable. Perhaps that's why, as one colleague of mine observed, these courses have few strong friends and no strong enemies
among the faculty. Yet it's not hard to imagine quite sensible, even
forceful explanations for continuing to expose spring semester first
year students to what perspective courses might provide-sustained
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interdisciplinary exposure and markedly different initiations into the
legal culture perhaps begin the list-whereas the defense of Constitutional Law and Property Law (at least as now taught in nearly
every instance) simply rehearses the defense of the first semester
curriculum. And for me that just doesn't make it.
So in the spring semester I envision, students would elect their
courseload from the core literacy courses provided by each curricula
and from certain other perspective courses. In general, all these
courses-both the perspective courses and the core literacy coursesshould take advantage of and extend what the first semester already
has accomplished. Rather than simply repeating the same lessons in
how to learn and how to use legal doctrine or the same initiations
into the legal culture, the perspective courses should dig deeper into
origins and influences of law and lawyering, as might current courses
on Jurisprudence or History of American Law, and they should
expand the universe of possible concerns, as might current courses
on Comparative Law and Law in Radically Different Cultures. Perspective courses should experiment, too, with provocative methods
of making available the nature of professional work, as might a new
course that imaginatively brings to life both what particular lawyers
do (corporate, criminal, lobbyist lawyers) during the course of an
"average" day and how law school education relates to categories
of practice and knowledge-a course that might be entitled A Day
In The Life Of A Lawyer.
At the same time, the package of core literacy courses for both
specialized curricula should expose students, each package in its own
way, to those ideas and skills fundamental to advancing along "an
intelligible path of learning" that leads, by the second and certainly
throughout the third year, to applied and creative work "plainly
beyond the power of beginners." ' 58 For those choosing the business
courses, that will probably mean (in light of our business faculty's
predilections) a literacy package that includes an introduction to
finance theory, accounting and transaction cost economics-what
some think of as the language of private ordering. It should also

58. See Michelman, supra note 35, at 355.
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include, I think, a lawyering course that introduces students, through
richly detailed simulated exercises, to the actual work of those in
business, to business lawyers, and to certain practice skills necessary
to do the job well.
This sort of core literacy package proceeds on the assumption
that business lawyers work regularly with their clients to anticipate
or respond to recurring problems of organization-problems that
include monitoring, risk allocation, establishing proper incentives,
and the proper scope of allocation constrained by a state that makes
some options unavailable (regulations forbid certain practices) and
others quite expensive (tax rules favor an organizational form otherwise not desirable). Finance theory and transaction cost economics
provide a general theoretical framework for identifying certain basic
issues in organization design; accounting provides the language by
which the success of ventures is measured, and opportunities for
gain identified and evaluated; and a situated lawyering course might
illustrate practical difficulties and the importance of certain skills
in putting these ideas to use in the midst of realistic private ordering
problems.
My reservations about this package of core literacy courses for
the aspiring business lawyer center around certain unfortunate pedagogical tendencies and their capacity to undermine the very purpose
of anti-generic legal education. Those who teach in the business
curriculum here (like their counterparts at most other institutions)
generally have been even less interested over the years than other
segments of the faculty both in the dynamics of lawyering (intellectual sensibilities and skills) and, relatedly, in innovative (particularly clinical) teaching methods. They appear particularly resistant
to, or convinced that they somehow transcend, what everyday practice and pedagogical innovation may tell them and their students.
At the same time, some of the business law faculty seem inclined,
perhaps now more than ever, to introduce seemingly every new speculative wrinkle in what they see as relevant interdisciplinary theory
(almost always those disciplines like finance and accounting are
strongly related to contemporary transaction cost economics). More
to the point, they present these wrinkles without making any obvious
effort (at least as students perceive it) to connect these ideas either
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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to what lawyers do or to how lawyers are trained. At times, this
"rugged" approach to learning interdisciplinary ideas seems sufficiently obstinate in its insensitivity to students that it almost appears
deliberately designed to disassociate the business law curriculum (and
certainly some teachers) once and for all from the familiar (and, to
the minds of some, embarrassingly "lightweight") tradition in law
schools of teaching hugely watered down "for lawyers" versions of
related concepts.
These two pedagogical tendencies-avoiding the dynamics of
lawyering and innovative (particularly clinical) teaching methods and
embracing without at all helping students to appreciate the romance
with speculative interdisciplinary ideas about private ordering-are
not, at least in this instance, unrelated. They originate in the same
narrow, technocratic view of the world-a view apparently no less
seductive for all its well-documented limits and weaknesses.5 9 In this
view, the only problems (at least the only "interesting" problems)
confronting business and business lawyers concern finding a way to
mutually beneficial optimization and getting the state out of the
picture whenever it interferes. In this view, business lawyers (like
other professional practitioners) help business select technical means
most suited to particular purposes.
This technocratic view of the world, not coincidentally, is both
reflected in and, in part, produced by the same academic literature
(particularly the legal academic literature) that the business law faculty will no doubt use in teaching finance, accounting, and transaction cost economics as part of the core literacy package. Pedagogic
habits thus dovetail neatly with high academic accounts of knowledge and practice. In a world view so tidy and so harmonious, rationalizations for ignoring imaginative teaching about lawyering
("just the mechanics for implementing the correct solution") and
explanations for throwing new theoretical wrinkles at students with-

59. For illustrative legal critiques see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems:
A Critique, 33 STAN. L. Rsv. 387 (1981); Michelman, Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property,
in NOMOS XXIV: ETcs, EcONOMICS, ArN m LAW 3 (1982); M. KEuAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL
LEGAL STUDIEs 114-85 (1987). For a more comprehensive critique see J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
CoMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1981).
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out adequately detailing their relevance ("a good lesson to be forced
to figure out, integrate, and stay on top of every 'technological'
innovation") both begin to seem almost plausible.
Yet business and business lawyers, no less that the rest of us,
live in the midst of conflict. They experience and take positions in
fights over resources, over authority, over responsibility, and over
decency. And like the rest of us, they make all decisions under
conditions of uncertainty with too little helpful information. Most
businesses and business lawyers know this. In fact, they'd tell you
they know it all too well and at least some of them frequently wonder out loud why law schools don't do a much better job of linking
curricular content and method to the world in which business and
business lawyers actually operate.
Anti-generic legal education, beginning with the core literacy
courses, aspires to expose students precisely to this challenge. The
sort of introductory lawyering course I envision is, in part, meant
to help bring home the pervasiveness of conflict and uncertainty and
the difficulty of working with others in this environment. It can
play its role in the training regimen, however, only if students are
realistically situated in the lives of businesses and their lawyers. That
prospect depends almost entirely on the willingness of the business
law teachers to turn their attention, their collective attention, to the
dynamics of lawyering and to the innovative pedagogical methods
best suited to its exploration.
Still, even a well-conceived and well-executed introductory lawyering course cannot alone introduce students to the world in which
business and business lawyers work. If anti-generic legal education
is to meet the challenge of training future business lawyers, the other
parts of the core literacy package themselves must provide both the
opportunities for situated learning and the reinforcement of the lessons of that learning.
Finance theory, accounting, and transaction cost economics may
well be the language of private ordering in business, and some new
speculative theoretical wrinkles may well matter to training the future business lawyer. Yet, the relevance of new theories in these
related disciplines at the very least should be made explicit in terms
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5

68

19891

ANTI-GENERIC LEGAL EDUCATION
López: Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially

of what does and might happen in the actual business world-a selfdisciplining exercise at least as valuable to teachers as it is to students. After all, rejecting hugely watered-down "for lawyers" versions of interdisciplinary ideas hardly warrants disavowing a teacher's
obligation to help students make connections.
To avoid misimpression, the core literacy package must at the
very least demonstrate the limits of, as well as the possibilities in,
theoretical finance, accounting, and transaction cost economics. After all, preferences are not actually fixed but are mutable; power is
not fixed in some "pre-social" way but socially constructed again
and again; behavior is hardly always rational but often irrational
and non-maximizing. I could go on but the obvious point is that
we should be training business lawyers who can operate sensibly in
the world they will find, not just in the abstracted world some theoretically-inclined academics find manageable. For this to happen
through the package of core literacy courses, business law faculty
will have to nurture an active intellectual and pedagogical curiosity
about the very world they claim most to know and care about, a
curiosity ironically at odds with tendencies that have dominated their
teaching (and their related scholarly) projects in the recent past.
If the package of core literacy courses for those who plan to
work with the subordinated is to expose spring semester first year
students to those ideas and skills fundamental to advancing in second
and third year to more difficult and demanding challenges, then it
should include a lawyering course. This course should introduce students, through richly detailed simulated exercises and related readings, both to the actual collaboration between certain subordinated
groups and those lawyers (and other allies) with whom they work
and to certain of those skills necessary in the fight for social change.
The package of core literacy courses should also include a course
that, by focusing on class, race/ethnicity, and gender, explores the
sources and nature of social and political subordination in this country. The course might be entitled Subordination: Traditions of
Thought and Experience.
The Traditions of Thought and Experience Course will draw on
three kinds of literature in its exploration of the source and nature
of subordination. It will tap into theoretical descriptions of subDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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ordination drawing on a range of traditions (e.g., liberal, Marxist,
neo-conservative, feminist, of color). It will also take advantage of
certain "ethnographic" accounts, some conventional and by academics and others quite unconventional and by subordinated people
themselves, describing various subordinated communities and experiences. And it will explore literature (from both lay and professional perspectives) examining the experience of those allies (most
centrally lawyers but including social activists, organizers, social
workers) who regularly intervene in the lives of subordinated people
and collaborate in the fight for social change.
The lawyering course is meant to emphasize what's special, what's
perhaps unrecognized, and what's certainly not systematically underlined about working with subordinated people. This emphasis is
meant to focus attention on 1) the lives of subordinated people (how
they get by day-to-day, how they anticipate and respond to problems, what kinds of conflicts they find themselves in, what lay and
professional help they get in these conflicts), and on 2) the knowledge and related skills that lawyers who work with subordinated
people must develop and draw on in order to do their work well
(street know-how as well as academic and professional knowledge,
coalition building and ally collaboration as well as hearing and trial
skills).
The two courses in the package are obviously meant to overlap
and reinforce one another. The Traditions and Thought and Experience Course is meant, in part, to introduce ideas about the origins of and ideas about subordination (in terms particularly of class,
race/ethnicity and gender), while the lawyering course is meant, in
part, to expose students to vying conceptions of practice dedicated
to working as a lawyer with people so subordinated by political and
social life. The Traditions of Thought and Experience Course is
meant, in part, to provide some understanding of the actual experience of subordination, while the lawyering course is meant, in
part, to begin training students by having them experience what
subordinated people and their lawyers actually do (and might do)
in response to their own understanding of situations. The Traditions
of Thought and Experience Course is meant, in part, to extend students' ability to find, to read, and to make use of both relevant
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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interdisciplinary literature (a skill already introduced, in my vision
of things, in the fall semester) and less conventional sources of insight about the world of the subordinated, while the lawyering course
is meant, in part, to introduce students to a small but illustrative
range of central (if sometimes relatively unacknowledged) skills in
the fight against subordination.
The success of these core literacy courses depends, no less than
their counterparts in the business curriculum, on the ability and
willingness of participating faculty to abandon certain pedagogical
tendendies. In the past, most courses concerned with lawyering (here
as at nearly all law schools) have paid entirely too much attention
to the lawyer and not enough to clients and allies. And, in the past,
most courses concerned with the politically and socially subordinated
(again here as at nearly all law schools) have treated forms of subordination either as self-evident experiences requiring little in the
way of extended critical observation or as social phenomena to be
intellectualized (if not academicized) almost entirely without taking
into account the views of subordinated people themselves.
These tendencies issue, at least in part, from the debilitating idea
of lawyering for the subordinated that reigns over law practice and
legal education. And they suggest how much over the years even
well-intentioned faculty have perhaps unwittingly helped reproduce
this regnant idea both in the lawyers they helped to train and in
the people with whom these lawyers work. For all the raging about
community, about hierarchy, about collaboration, and about voice
that for years now has saturated left-legal academic talk, we all may
have to admit our implication in a zanily self-defeating educational
regimen. The core literacy courses, and the anti-generic ambitions
they are meant to kick-off in the training of those future lawyers
who will work with the subordinated, demand at least as much selfscrutiny by participating faculty as anything else.
B.

Second and Third Years

If both specialized curricula are to build sensibly on what's gone
on in this newly envisioned first year, they must take account at
the beginning of the second year of where students will be and what
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989

71

WEST
West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.LA
91,W
Iss.REVIEW
2 [1989], Art. 5

[Vol. 91

they will need. At that point students will have picked up, if not
mastered, the basics of how to learn and how to use legal doctrine,
and they will have become passably literate, not just in the ways of
the legal culture, but in the ways of the people with whom they
plan to work. You may not yet want one of these student working
alone as your lawyer, but you certainly wouldn't mind having the
student on your team. Still, if there are good reasons to believe that
beginning second-year students will need reinforcement of what
they've already learned, there are also good reasons to be confident
that they can find whatever reinforcement they need (and then some)
through second and third year courses that demand that they reach
beyond what they already know in part by putting it to use.
A New Training Regimen to Substitute For The One Now
Dominated By the "'Big Classroom" Model of Teaching and
Learning
In order to do this, I think we at Stanford must essentially call
an end to and perhaps even entirely abandon the domination of the
"big classroom" model of doctrinal teaching and learning for second
and third year students. While that model of teaching, reimagined
and reinvigorated, can still play an important role in legal education,
it seems best suited to the aims of the first year, more particularly
to the twin aims of the fall semester of the first year, cultural initiation and doctrinal acquisition. Once students pick up generally
how to learn and how to use legal doctrine, then the big classroom
as now constituted seems not only terribly wasteful when compared
to well-designed self-teaching mechanisms but it also seems ill-designed to help individual students focus on their particular weaknesses. Perhaps someone can make a convincing case (though I doubt
it) that a certain course will still need to be slowly unfolded through
the big classroom model, but for purposes of anti-generic education
at Stanford we should generally presume that other approaches better handle what traditionally we've done for second and third year
students through the big classroom.
In place of a second and third year curriculum dominated by
this "big classroom" model of teaching and learning, I would train
both future business lawyers and those who plan to work with the
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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subordinated through a newly structured regimen. In this regimen,
each specialized curricula would offer, probably in the fall of the
second year, any additional mandatory literacy courses. Each specialized curricula also would offer an overarching "doctrinal information transfer" course, a course comprised of a series of three
or four week "mini-courses" that probably would extend over both
semesters of the second year and that would be taught by a team
of faculty members. Each of these information-transfer courses would
make available to students a general command of the structure (more
than the forgettable detail) of certain areas of law central to their
future work. The course would rely extensively on specially designed
self-teaching mechanisms (central cases and statutes, outlines, workbook and computer and interactive video exercises)A0 And instead
of traditional big classroom interaction, a very limited number of
class hours would be reserved for specially focused group activitymost obviously, for review of particularly difficult applied problems
and for the oral exposition of any newly evolved ideas (critiques
and alternative visions) that an instructor had not yet had the time
to integrate into the written self-teaching materials.
In addition to any remaining literacy courses and to the overarching doctrinal information transfer course, the newly envisioned
second and third year training regimen would have each of the specialized curricula offer a set of highly intensive workshops. These
workshops would be at the heart of the second and third year education, and much of upper-level intellectual and political life would
focus around their activities and attempt to take advantage of what
they bring to campus and offer to the outside world. The workshops
would be designed and coordinated by each curricula's faculty and
would examine in depth and in detail particularly important areas

60. A starting point for preparing these self-teaching mechanisms would be student-authored
outlines and teacher's manuals and notes. During the past year I've collected the best current outlines
floating around the law school and the best teacher's manuals. See, e.g., R. WEISBERO & J. KAPLAN,
TEACHER'S MANUAL, C.musAL LAW (1985). Moreover, with relatively little effort you can find other
creative teaching devices. For example, see the interactive ideas of Tim Hallahan, including You Be
The Judge, Trial Skills Illustrated I & II, and Motion Skills Illustrated produced by Harvard Law
School, and distributed by Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co. Also see the discussion of interactive
videos in Harabling, ABA Consortium Introduces Video-Audio Interaction to Seminars, 67 A.B.A.

J. 736 (1981).
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of situated life and legal policy, particularly important dimensions
of situated lawyering, or both. And, like any well-conceived practice
(including the most extraordinary teaching now going on in the big
classroom), these workshops would be outfitted for the task of apprehending and commanding a practice with students learning by
doing, teachers teaching by a sort of coaching, and each challenging
the other as together they work through, critique and imagine alternatives to available bodies of knowledge.
Some of these workshops would require students to work through
well-developed literatures and data; others would require students
to work as practitioners in richly simulated situations; others still
would require students to work as practitioners in actual supervised
field situations; still others would require students to undertake new
conceptual work or serious empirical studies on concerns long-neglected or newly emerging. These workshops would no doubt vary
in size (though all would be small), in unit allocation, and to some
degree, in intensity. But as a whole the workshops would be organized by faculty participating in each specialized curriculum to
make available to students, insofar as resources permitted, a range
of training in those areas of life and legal policy and those dimensions of lawyering critical to their future vocations.
The final feature of the second and third year regimen I imagine
would entail a set of courses that "straddle" both specialized curricula. These courses might include a range of international coursesfrom International Economic Law and Organization to International
Environmental Law-that affect specifically those in business and
those subordinated in both this country and abroad. And they might
include, too, certain self-consciously "academic" courses-like Empirical Methods or Legal Studies-that are designed in part to train
future academics for the production of scholarship. And they might
well include certain courses-like Legal Ethics, Constitutional Law
and Mass Media Law-either designed deliberately to invoke or inevitably reflecting contrasts between those enabled by social and
political life and those subordinated by it. Yet even in these straddle
courses, every effort would be made both to transfer information
through specially designed written materials and exercises and to
situate students either within certain discrete traditions or within the
actual experiences of certain people.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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A Very Brief Elaboration of the New Regimen: the Second and
Third Year For Business Lawyers and For Those Planning to
Work with the Subordinated
What would this new second and third year training regimen
actually look like with flesh on its bones? I won't offer much detail,
but the general outlines of both specialized curricula would seem
apparent. The business curriculum might want to make other theoretical concepts, besides those previously covered in the spring semester, prerequisites to advanced study in the available workshops.
For all participating students this might mean becoming familiar
with ways of conceiving, implementing, and challenging conceptions
of corporate social responsibility. And for those students interested
in regulatory issues-treating the questions of whether regulations
are sensible rather than simply optimizing for a party given a particular regulatory scheme-this might mean becoming literate, too,
in the branches of economics most relevant to standard regulatory
topics-say industrial organization to deal with antitrust and regulated industries, public finance to deal with tax policy, and perhaps
some combination of information economics and advanced finance
to deal with "investor-protective" legislation.
The business curriculum would also have to decide both what
areas of law most affect business and how those areas might be
transformed into effective self-teaching information-transfer mechanisms. Obvious candidates would include business associations;
the capital market; banking; bankruptcy; copyright, trademark, and
patent law; land use regulations; real estate regulations; antitrust;
and private international law. Obvious sources of help in converting
traditional materials into self-teaching mechanisms would include
teacher's manuals, instructor notes and (often more importantly)
specially student-prepared outlines. Finally, though the possibilities
for intensive business workshops are many, some areas of business
life and some dimensions of lawyering would seem inevitably central:
tax policy, tax planning, business reorganization, business enterprise
counseling, land use planning, and "buyouts" and "deals."
In the second and third year of training for those planning to
work with the subordinated, there would be a year-long information
transfer course that might be entitled The Core Areas of Law AfDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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fecting the Subordinated. The course would cover law ranging across
certain obvious areas of importance (immigration, housing, employment, gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, family, juveniles, criminal procedure and evidence) and across certain other areas
often neglected in their importance to subordinated people (income
transfer policy, debt/bankruptcy, consumer protection, family financial planning, business organizations, land use/economic development). Though this information transfer course would focus on
the general structure (rather than forgettable detail) of legal doctrine
and rely heavily upon self-teaching mechanisms, many areas of law
covered likely would serve as points of departure for one (or more)
advanced workshops. In this way, student knowledge of most core
areas of law affecting the subordinated would be extended (reinforced and elaborated) during the course of the second and third
years.
The curriculum for those planning to work with the subordinated
would also offer a mandatory literacy course in the fall of the second
year to complement the two literacy courses offered in the spring
semester of the first year. We might call this course Core Ideas in
Economic Thought Central to Working with Subordinated People.
The general purpose of this course would be to make available to
those who will practice with the subordinated ideas that, in my experience, are often neglected in their importance, except to the exient
that they are feared and in many ways avoided by many progressive
and radical lawyers. It would be specifically designed to draw on
and explicate economic ideas both broader in range than those preoccupying the Law and Economics movement in this country and
more responsive to the life and the problem-solving of subordinated
people and their lawyers than the ideas found in most conventional
economics courses. It would aim not only to expose the limits and
assumptions of the neoclassical model of individual and aggregated
(market) decision making, but also to prepare students to work
through J;ssues (rent control, dual labor markets, worker and consumer safety, for example) that will be the focus of certain intensive
workshops and of their future practice.
Finally, the curriculum for those planning to work with the subordinated would center second and third year training around a set
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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of small workshops. These workshops would focus on specific dimensions of lawyering, on specific social circumstances and related
strategies for change, and perhaps most often on both. They would
draw their inspiration, in all that they cover and in their pedagogic
design, from the emerging rebellious idea of lawyering. In so doing,
the workshops' collective aim would be to challenge the regnant idea
of lawyering in a double sense: each workshop would not only train
lawyers differently than before, but together they would (in fairly
short time) achieve the same cross-fertilization, reciprocal enlightenment, and cumulative reinforcement that the workshops hope to
help encourage in the constellation of allies fighting for radical social
change. 61
Guided by the rebellious idea of lawyering, these workshops would
train students in dimensions of lawyering both familiar and unfamiliar to traditional training. These dimensions would evolve over
the years, but presently would include the following: being a collaborator; being involved in informal remedial ceremonies; being
involved in economic development; being involved in financial planning; being involved in efforts to teach self-help and lay lawyering;
being involved in litigation; being involved in a trial and an administrative hearing; being involved in efforts to improve the health
and safety of a workplace; being involved in an effort to begin or
to restructure a law office to accommodate practice with the subordinated. The general ambitions would be to integrate into workshops meaningful changes in everyday lawyering and to foreshadow
and, when necessary, to provoke necessary transformations in everyday practice.
While perhaps appearing more "fixed" than the dimensions of
lawyering, the social circumstances and related strategies for social
change explored in these workshops would provide a formidable
challenge to students and teachers. The circumstances and strategies
would include matters of inevitable complexity: the situated study
of community development, of housing, of benefits, of education,
of mental health, of the workplace and labor markets, of economic

61. See Michelman, supra note 35, at 355.
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democracy, of the life of undocumented and recently documented
workers, of gays and lesbians, of various peoples of color, of various
groups of women, of abused and neglected children, of the family,
of the elderly, and of those enmeshed in crime. The workshops
would thus demand both interdisciplinary perspectives on, and perhaps an ever-changing historical assessment of, current conditions
and their relationship to past and on-going efforts. The general ambition, again, would be both to weave into workshops new and
ignored knowledge of daily life and to reconceive and implement
through workshops concrete approaches to fundamental social
change.
What might you generally expect of this new anti-generic training
regimen? My own experience with, and my knowledge of, those
current second and third year courses structured compatibly with
this new regimen provide considerable optimism about what to look
forward to from these changes. Second and third year training in
each specialized curricula will both engage and prepare students in
ways vastly superior to our present efforts. Students will know, along
with teachers, how their education hangs together, how it builds on
itself, how it demands of them a command of what they've already
learned and a desire to push ahead to harder problems and ideas.
They will also know, along with their teachers, how their education
links up with practice and, more importantly, how it connects to
the people with whom they'll be working. As a result, over the
course of their three years at law school, they will become increasingly able to contribute to individual courses, to intellectual and
practical projects, and to the design and execution of the training
regimen itself. At graduation they will be ready to assume the obligations of practice and a commitment to scrutinize and improve
their own work and the work of those around them as they pursue
particular career paths.
All this will be true not just of those students who will work
with the subordinated or who will work with those in business. It
will be true, too, of those who choose other or many careers during
their lifetimes. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, "generalists"
do better work when they're trained to know (and, therefore, trained
to grasp what it means to know) something deeply and well. They're
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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then more likely to bring to their jobs and to discrete tasks a modesty
that regularly serves them well-a modesty that impels a profound
curiosity about any social situation in which they're asked to intervene, and a modesty that appreciates the immense importance of
both "indigenous lay" and "outside expert" knowledge at the same
time that it understands the important continuities between problemsolving intelligences. In short, this new anti-generic second and third
year regimen will best generic legal education, I think, at just that
job law schools have always claimed to do so well.
To be sure, I have my shopping list of concerns about the second
and third year regimen taking shape-concerns that in most instances
apply to both specialized curricula, if often in importantly distinguishable ways. For now, however, several seem worth identifying
in the context of the proposed curriculum for working with the
subordinated. And, along with these concerns, it matters, I think,
to note currently planned efforts (both fuzzily general and quite
specific) in an effort to respond partially to each.
Anti-generic legal education presupposes the necessity for considerable interaction between those of us who most regularly work
within the law school and those subordinated groups and their allies
who most regularly work outside formal legal education. Without
sounding unduly pollyannaish, we might someday even move toward
healthy collaboration. As any honest social activist will tell you,
there's no magical formula for making this happen. Platitudinous
sounding advice (like it'll take time and a lot of hard work) actually
does make good sense. And a willingness to put yourself out there
in uncertain circumstances often may help move things along.
Still, in the effort to nurture productive interaction, there's no
doubt that everyone involved will have to confront-again and again
and in ourselves as well as in each other-patterns of association
antithetical both to our vocations and to the vision of anti-generic
legal education. Identifying these patterns generally helps, as does
an effort to understand accompanying frustrations and suspicions.
It remains a fragile undertaking, though, and experience suggests
that things may sometimes break apart. Still, it may provide some
hope to realize that (through friendships, previous or current practices, field placement courses, externships and the like) some people
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who most regularly work within the law school already have relatively thriving working relationships with certain subordinated people and their allies, relationships that might be extended into new
territory and that might serve over time to instruct us all.
If anti-generic legal education presupposes the general necessity
for considerable interaction between those currently inside and outside legal education, the curriculum for those who plan to work
with the subordinated aspires specifically to build ways of communicating regularly with progressive and radical lawyers about law
practice. In so doing, it aims both to invite continuing feedback on
its intellectual and pedagogical conceptions and to provide ways for
worthy ideas in the new training regime to influence the fight for
fundamental social change. Toward this end, informal meetings and
conversations matter as much as, perhaps more than, formal seminars, conferences, and symposia-though obviously each might enrich the other. And the wise involvement of practitioners in courses,
particularly the planned array of workshops, provides possibilities
for frank and penetrating exchanges that, by and large, have been
neglected and mishandled in the past.
But, at least for now, I am concerned less with creating modestly
effective ways to converse and more with creating significantly improved, indeed reconceived, conversation about practice. Whenever
progressive lawyers and those in legal education talk or imagine
talking to one another "seriously" about lawyering, far too often
it concerns developing an ingenious doctrinal angle on a particular
problem. Occasionally, they may move on to what both probably
consider more "academic" (though not necessarily impractical or
irrelevant) topics-say the continuing debate between the relative
political significance of service and impact cases or the ethics of
particular tactics or the need to develop new (but traditionally structured and delivered) doctrinal or clinical courses about certain areas
of law. But nothing else much happens. Worse still, you sometimes
get the sense that neither group thinks the other has much to say
about what matters most.
Nothing is inherently wrong with these conversations. Doctrine
and new courses and ethical questions matter. So, too, does the
political significance of certain trade-offs of time and commitment.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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(Though I think the largely tired debate about the wisdom of service
and impact cases unduly circumscribes what is at issue, in part by
continuing to dichotomize these particular strategies-but that's a
topic for another day.) Still, in my experience, talk about these
topics has become entirely a substitute for-maybe even an excuse
for-not actually thinking and talking hard about the extraordinary
dynamics of engaging as lawyers in the fight for radical social change.
What about conversations concerning the structures and routines of
law offices and their effect on clients and allies? What about conversations concerning the relationship between certain obviously
"legal" strategies and those that historically have been treated as
falling outside (or beneath) a lawyer's expertise? What about conversation concerning the collaboration between subordinated people
and those with whom they (are often forced to) work?
My point should be all too obvious by now. The curriculum for
those who plan to work with the subordinated does aspire specifically to build ways of communicating regularly with progressive and
radical lawyers about law practice-but not simply to reproduce the
same old partial, impoverished (and, I think, often self-deceptive)
talk. Refocusing conversation will not be a simple task, either among
practitioners or among faculties. It will demand of all of us, to one
degree or another, the uncomfortable disclosure of obvious omissions and nagging doubts. And it undoubtedly will require a network
of old and new devices, in part to give everyone an idea of what
we now have in mind and what we might in time imagine ourselves
doing.
In fact, in part to help provide a "sample" of what this newly
enriched talk about practice might look and sound and feel like,
the new training regimen already has planned a new biannual newsletter. The newsletter will invite particularly resourceful progressive
practitioners (at the beginning mainly, but not exclusively, lawyers
and both alumni and friends) to describe, say in ten to twenty pages,
the relationships, ambitions, strategies, conflicts, contradictions,
confusions, uncertainties, disappointments, and achievements of
particular fights and projects. It will read, we hope, like the best
ethnographies-detailed without being at all anti-theoretical, honest
without being unduly self-indulgent, self-critical without being unDisseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1989
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duly self-deprecating. And it will serve, we trust, not only to bring
to life certain curricular ambitions but to help those allied in the
fight against subordination (particularly lawyers) to stay in touch
with what others are thinking and experiencing.
V.

So WHAT ABOUT ALL THE UNANSWERED AND UNANSWERABLE

QUESTIONS?

For all that I've said in this essay, there's plenty more that I
might have said. I might have talked, and at length, about the necessary relationship between anti-generic legal education and admissions. I might have talked, and at length, about the necessary
relationship between anti-generic legal education and career services.
I might have talked, and at length, about the necessary relationship
between anti-generic legal education and faculty recruitment. I might
have talked, and at length, about the necessary relationship of antigeneric legal education and alumni fundraising.
More surprisingly perhaps, there's plenty more that some others
would insist that I talk about before any institution should take
seriously, much less move on, the changes that I urge. Insisting that

there's still more to talk about and that there are still too many
unanswered and unanswerable questions raised by an alternative
pedagogical regime has always been a stalling tactic employed by
those who feel either most comfortable with what we now do in
law schools or most threatened by what we might do to change our
ambitions and routines. They are the same ones who always seem
to call (and to convince almost everyone else to call) even modest
curricular innovations "experimental," by which they mean to connote, of course, premature, untested, quirky and probably unsound.
Yet that rhetorical move, for all its ubiquity, has always struck me
as peculiarly unpersuasive. After all, what could be more experimental, in the sense of having very little idea of the particular consequences of particular practices on particular people, than the
uncoordinated array of courses and teachers most law schools subject their students to through generic legal education?
At the same time, I'm entirely aware that much of what I've
asked you to entertain has not been cheery or flattering. Some of
what I've said may strike those of you not directly involved in legal
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol91/iss2/5
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education as surprising and maybe even implausible, while at the
same time it perhaps gives you cause for concern about how law
school training affects your own lives. And some of what I've said
may strike those of you directly involved in legal education as too
serious, too negative, and too self-flagellating, although perhaps it
also gives you pause about certain of your own routines and arrangements.
You owe it to the institutions and people with whom you work
not to let yourself escape too facilely from my account or proposal,
however strong the impulse either to disbelieve or to dismiss. What
I have said may be insufficiently empirical, too polemical, or just
plain wrong. And perhaps you should strongly disagree with me.
But make sure to mull it over, in part because we're all a little too
good at evading-even outbrazening-exposure to what we do and
what we put up with.
And what about all those unanswered and unanswerable questions? We all know way more than enough to take action right now.
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